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0  Overview 
If people care about an opponent’s well-being economists refer to other regarding pref-
erences. Smith (1759) already considered that people comply to moral rules. However, re-
search on other regarding preferences well-established has only been recent decades. Experi-
mental economics is largely responsible for new findings on this research field. Numerous 
studies show that the idea of solely self-interest types needs revising. The large number of 
empirical findings has led to new theories. These works harmonize experimentally document-
ed behavior and rationality in terms of utility maximization. Recent theories can be classified 
into outcome or intention based theories. 
Outcome based models compare payoff differences across players. Important works are 
theories about inequality aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000). If someone is better (worse) off than an opponent (un)favorable inequality leads to a 
decrease in utility. Remorse and envy become part of utility in that way. The theory about 
quasi-maximin preferences introduced by Charness and Rabin (2002 henceforth C&R) is a 
similar model. However, envy – i.e., a decrease in the utility through unfavorable inequality – 
is not part of the model. In contrast to inequality aversion the utility is positively correlated 
with the opponent`s payoff even if the opponent is better off. Thus, efficiency consideration 
instead of avoiding unfavorable inequality becomes a main part of this model.  
Intention based models are more complex. Besides outcome the expectations (beliefs) 
about the opponent’s action and belief (second order belief) are part of the utility. Thus, not 
just the chosen action but also the alternative actions become relevant and determine an oppo-
nent’s kindness. Since (un)kindness triggers (un)kindness this concept is well-suited to model 
reciprocity. Intention based models were introduced by Rabin (1993), C&R, Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).  
These theories are often-cited but rarely applied game theoretically in experimental 
studies to deduce hypotheses and interpret results. However, without theoretical embedding 
serious interpretation of the experimentally observed behavior is difficult. Thus, these theories 
might help not just to document but also to understand human behavior. This is the main idea 
of my thesis. 
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A behavioral game theoretical background is the origin of all four experimental studies 
in the following chapters. They investigate the effects of inequality aversion, quasi-maximin 
preferences and reciprocity in different contexts.  
Chapter 1 investigates the feasibility of efficiency gains in a principal agent relation-
ship by voluntary leadership.1 In a modified investment game a principal may leave the role 
of the investor to an agent or to take the investment decision himself/herself. The results show 
that voluntary leadership – i.e., if the principal take investment decision himself/herself – 
compared to an enforced leadership as well as to an exogenously determined sequence in-
creases both investment and backtransfer. According to this, the voluntary leadership is a 
strong signal of trust that will be rewarded. Thereby, efficiency gains arise. This finding is 
even more interesting because it is game theoretically not predictable that ceteris paribus vol-
untary leadership triggers higher positive reciprocity than enforced leadership 
Chapter 2 investigates negative reciprocity. If someone harms an opponent, we may ex-
pect negative reciprocity. But if a worse off player harms his/her better off opponent just to 
reduce an unfavorable inequality several models about other regarding preferences do not 
predict negative reciprocity. The study uses an experimental game of C&R. A worse off pro-
poser may either choose an outside option that induces an outcome with unfavorable inequali-
ty or pass the decision to a better off responder. If the proposer does not choose the outside 
option, he can eliminate the inequality. However, not choosing the outside option reduces the 
payoff of the responder and he/she may punish the proposer for this. C&R document a sub-
stantial frequency of negative reciprocity. My study is a robustness test of C&R’s findings in 
slightly modified games. In contrast to C&R’s observations and in line with several theories 
about other regarding preferences negative reciprocity cannot be documented at all. 
Chapter 3 is a principal agent game.2 It investigates the performance and self-selection 
of heterogeneous agents in a group or an individual task. The principal offers linear pay con-
                                                   
1 Chapter 1 is a joint piece of work with Fabian Kleine and Manfred Königstein. This chapter was also part of 
the thesis “Asymmetry, Heterogeneity and Endogeneity in Principal Agent Relations” by Fabian Kleine 
in a similar form. However, only those parts were examinable for my thesis which were assigned to me. The 
examining board was notified about these parts and they were also attested by the co-authors. Furthermore, this 
chapter will be published in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (forthcoming) in a similar 
version. 
2 Chapter 3 is a joint piece of work with Fabian Kleine, Manfred Königstein and Gabriele K. Lünser. This chap-
ter was also part of the thesis “Asymmetry, Heterogeneity and Endogeneity in Principal Agent Rela-
tions” by Fabian Kleine in a similar form. However, only those parts were examinable for my thesis which were 
assigned to me. The examining board was notified about these parts and they were also attested by the co-
authors. 
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tracts with a fixed wage and return share for both tasks. The productivity of the agents in the 
individual task is the same. In the group task 50% of the agents have a high productivity while 
50% have a low productivity. Thus, high (low) types are more productive in the group (indi-
vidual) task. However, shirking incentive compromises efficient allocation and effort level. 
The results show that the principal can influence both the task selection as well as an agent’s 
performance – i.e., effort level. High productive agents more often choose group task and 
provide a higher level of effort. However, self-selection does not work perfectly so that the 
allocation is rather inefficient. 
Chapter 4 investigates how the method of role uncertainty biases other regarding prefer-
ences. Role uncertainty is a way of collecting experimental data which is closely related to the 
strategy method. The method of role uncertainty is used in simple experimental distribution 
games like the dictator game and was applied by e.g., C&R and Engelmann and Strobel 
(2004). All participants – the proposer as well as the recipient – play the experiment in the 
role of the proposer. However, the participants learn their actual role only after the decision 
making. The method generates two times more observations and saves costs. I investigate role 
uncertainty in modified dictator games. The dictator has to decide between two allocations. 
The first allocation is in line with inequality aversion while the second allocation is in line 
with quasi-maximin preferences. However, the dictator’s payoff is never affected by his/her 
choice. Under role (un)certainty most of the decisions are in line with inequality aversion 
(quasi-maximin preferences). The difference is significant, the method of role uncertainty 
biases other regarding preferences. Thus, to apply the method of role uncertainty in experi-
mental studies is highly unadvisable.  
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1  Voluntary Leadership in an Experimental Trust 
 Game 
1.1   Introduction 
The trust game introduced by Berg et al. (1995) represents a basic two person conflict in 
which players may choose cooperative moves sequentially to achieve a mutually beneficial 
outcome. The first mover (trustor) chooses an investment which induces a return that accrues 
to the second mover (trustee). The second mover then can backtransfer money to the first 
mover but may also decide to keep the return for himself/herself. The first mover cannot use a 
court to enforce a payback of the initial investment or a part of the surplus in addition to in-
vestment. He/she may, however, trust that the second mover will reciprocate the given “gift”. 
Without trust there will be no surplus in this game. But if there is trust, and if higher in-
vestment leads to higher backtransfer, we refer to this as the “Trust-And-Reciprocity” mecha-
nism.3 Such a positive correlation between investment and backtransfer has been shown in 
many experimental studies including the seminal study by Berg et al. (1995). It is also docu-
mented in a recent meta-analysis by Johnson and Mislin (2011). From a pure rationalistic 
viewpoint this result is surprising: An egoistic and rational second mover should not back-
transfer any money, and therefore the first mover should not invest in the first place. But the 
result is not surprising from everyday experience, which tells us that sequential gift exchange 
is common in social interaction. Despite this everyday experience it is interesting to study the 
forces that strengthen or weaken the Trust-And-Reciprocity mechanism. Camerer (2003) de-
scribes how several structural and individual factors, like e.g. stake size and nationality, influ-
ence behavior in trust games. Johnson and Mislin (2011)4 investigate cultural differences in 
trust games. In addition to empirical studies theoretical models have been developed that 
might explain Trust-And-Reciprocity within a wider rationality framework (see e.g. the social 
preference models of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger(2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006)). 
Our study here contributes to the research on trust games by investigating the influence 
of voluntary leadership. Voluntary leadership means that one of the two players can decide 
whether to be first mover or second mover in the trust game. In natural relationships it is quite 
                                                   
3 Reciprocity in experimental labour markets is reported e.g. in Gächter and Fehr (2001). 
4 Furthermore, see the related studies on gift exchange experiments by Charness et al. (2004), Falk et al. (1999); 
Fehr et al. (1993), (1997) and (1998), and Gächter and Falk (2001). 
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usual that the sequencing of moves is not predetermined. The mere fact that one player takes 
the “burden of the first move” in such a situation (we call this an “endogenous trust game”) 
could make a difference compared to a situation, where the order of moves is predetermined. 
In an endogenous trust game the order of moves may be open in the sense that either player 
may volunteer to make the first move. But one may also think of situations where one player 
has the right to determine the order of moves. In a hierarchical relationship, like e.g. the prin-
cipal-agent relationship of a manager and a worker, it might be the principal’s choice whether 
to make the first move himself/herself or whether to pass this to the agent. It is such a situa-
tion which we had in mind in designing our experiment. 
We present a lab experiment on an endogenous trust game in which one player (the 
principal) may decide to leave the investment choice to the agent or to take the investment 
decision himself/herself. In the latter case we refer to this as “voluntary leadership”. We show 
that voluntary leadership increases investment and increases backtransfer of the second mover 
compared to the alternative sequencing in which the agent is investor. We also show that in-
vestment and backtransfer is higher under voluntary leadership than in the control treatment 
with exogenously determined sequencing. Furthermore, we show that risk preference and ine-
quality aversion as modelled formally by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) influence behavior in the 
endogenous trust game. Comparing effect sizes with standard results in trust games we find 
that voluntary leadership has a quite remarkable effect on behavior. 
In the next section we summarize the related literature. In section 1.3 we describe our 
experimental game and provide a theoretical analysis. In addition to a benchmark theoretical 
solution based on standard preferences we analyze the game assuming inequality aversion and 
risk preferences. The analyses lead to a set of empirical hypotheses. Section 1.4 describes 
experimental procedures, and section 1.5 provides data analyses and empirical results. Section 
1.6 concludes. 
1.2  Related Literature 
To our knowledge this is the first study on endogenous sequencing in trust games. 
Gächter and Renner (2005), Güth et al. (2007), Kumru and Vesterlund (2005) are related stud-
ies which consider a leader’s choice in public good experiments. They report increased con-
tributions and efficiency gains compared to simultaneous public good games due to high first 
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mover contribution. In these studies leadership is not voluntary but predetermined by the ex-
perimenter. 
There are only a few studies on endogenous leadership in experimental literature5. 
Closest to our design are the studies of Abrak and Villeval (2007) and Rivas and Sutter 
(2009). Abrak and Villeval (2007) investigate a public good experiment with endogenous 
leadership. On the first stage one group member can contribute voluntarily while other group 
members contribute simultaneously after observing the contribution of the leader. A substan-
tial number of subjects (about one out of four) are willing to act as leader. These first movers 
contribute significantly more to the public good compared to the contributions in simultane-
ous public good games. As a result second mover`s contributions are rising. First movers earn 
less than second movers but voluntary leadership induces efficiency gains. Rivas and Sutter 
(2009) study several forms of leadership in public good games and compare exogenously en-
forced leadership and endogenous (voluntary) leadership. They also find higher contributions 
to the public good under endogenous leadership. 
In our trust game with endogenous leadership the leader’s payoff hinges on the decision 
of a single player, the second mover. Compared to a public good game the leader might find 
this more risky. Furthermore, the trust signal implied by voluntary leadership might have a 
different value in a two player trust game than in a public good game. 
1.3  Experimental Game and Theoretical Predictions 
1.3.1  The Trust Game with Endogenous Leadership    
  and Symmetric Endowments 
Consider a principal-agent game between two players, player P (principal) and player A 
(agent), which are both initially endowed with 10 money units. The game comprises three 
stages: 
 
                                                   
5 Fonseca et al. (2005), (2006) and Huck et al. (2002) investigate duopoly games with endogenous timing. Firms 
can choose their quantities in one of two periods. Potters et al. (2005) investigate a Public Good Game with 
endogenous sequencing when some donors do not know the value of the Public Good. Nosenzo and Sefton 
(2009) investigate a Public Good Game with endogenous move structure. The players can choose their contribu-
tion in one of two periods. Furthermore, the players receive different returns of the public good. 
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Stage 1: P decides upon the sequencing of moves in the trust game that follows in 
stages 2 and 3. P has two options, sequence “P-First” or sequence “A-First”, 
with the meaning that in case of P-First (see stages 2.a and 3.a) the trust 
game is played with P being investor (first mover) and A being trustee (sec-
ond mover) and vice versa in case of A-First (see stages 2.b and 3.b).  
If P-First: 
Stage 2.a: P decides upon investment px  with { }10,...,1,0∈px . Then A receives the 
amount px3 . 
Stage 3.a: A decides upon backtransfer ay  with { }10,...,1,0∈ay . Then P receives the 
amount ay3 . 
 
If A-First: 
Stage 2.b: A decides upon investment ax  with { }10,...,1,0∈ax . Then P receives the 
amount ax3 . 
Stage 3.b: P decides upon backtransfer py  with { }10,...,1,0∈py . Then A receives the 
amount py3 . 
 
Payoffs are determined as follows:  
app yx 310 +−=π  and paa xy 310 +−=π  
(if P-First) 
or  
app xy 310 +−=π  and paa yx 310 +−=π  
(if A-First) 
 
This concludes the description of the game. If P chooses P-First we refer to this as the 
principal’s choice of “voluntary leadership”. The game theoretic solution with egoistic and 
rational players – i.e., our benchmark solution – is straightforward. In stage 3 the trustee has 
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no incentive to backtransfer money, therefore the backtransfer will be zero. Consequently, it 
does not pay to invest in the first place, so investment will be zero. Anticipating this outcome 
player P is indifferent with respect to the sequencing of moves. Thus, the game theoretic solu-
tion with rational, payoff-maximizing players predicts that each player keeps the 10 money 
units, foregoing a potential efficient payoff of 30 for each if investment and backtransfer were 
maximal. 
Stages 2 and 3 of our game are similar but not exactly equal to the trust game of Berg et 
al. (1995). In our game investments and backtransfers are tripled whereas in Berg et al. (1995) 
only investments were tripled. Furthermore, in our case the strategy space for backtransfers is 
fixed – the numbers 0 to 10 – whereas in Berg et al. it is endogenous – the numbers 0 up to 
three times the investment. Our design allowed us to describe the strategy spaces and their 
payoff consequences independent of the chosen sequence (P-First versus A-First). Further-
more, our design allows the second mover to return more money than received which is ex-
cluded in standard trust games. We actually found that some participants do so. 
We know from many experiments on these games that contrary to the benchmark solu-
tion players do cooperate: Players trust in the second mover (the trustee) by choosing positive 
investment levels, and trustees reciprocate by choosing positive backtransfers. If investment 
and backtransfer are positively correlated we interpret this as Trust-And-Reciprocity mecha-
nism. 
Our experiment is designed to investigate whether the Trust-And-Reciprocity mecha-
nism is influenced by voluntary leadership – i.e., a player’s choice of the first mover position 
in the trust game. We expect the following influences: 
Hypothesis 1: If the principal chooses to be leader (voluntary leadership) investment 
 (Hyp. 1.a) and backtransfer (Hyp. 1.b) are higher than if the principal forces the agent 
 to be first mover in the trust game. 
This is our main research hypothesis. It can be motivated as follows: If P chooses to be 
leader, he/she exposes himself/herself to higher risk, because being first mover in our trust 
game is a more risky position than being second mover. Therefore we consider this as a strong 
signal of trust in addition to the subsequent choice of investment. Player A reciprocates P’s 
trust by higher backtransfer – i.e., we predict higher backtransfer controlling for investment. 
To control for investment one may consider e.g. the backtransfer rate (backtransfer divided by 
investment) or backtransfer minus investment. If P anticipates a higher backtransfer  rate due 
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to voluntary leadership, incentives for investment are higher and consequently we predict 
higher investment. These arguments are intuitive but they are inconsistent with the benchmark 
solution of the game. In the next section we rely on more formal considerations of social pref-
erences and risk aversion to motivate our hypotheses.  
1.3.2  Social Preferences and Risk Preferences 
While the standard model of egoistic and rational individuals cannot explain coopera-
tion in trust games, this is possible under the assumption of other regarding (social) prefer-
ences. We will rely on the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999 henceforth 
F&S). Accordingly an inequality averse player maximizes the following utility function (we 
refer to this as F&S-preferences): 
{ } { }0,max
1
10,max
1
1
ij
ji
jji
ji
jjj nn
U ππβππαπ −
−
−−
−
−= ∑∑
≠≠
 
with restrictions 10 <≤ jβ  and jj βα ≥ . The variables jπ  and iπ  represent monetary pay-
offs of players j and i while the parameter jα  ( jβ ) represents the degree of aversion against 
unfavorable (favorable) inequality. In Appendix A.1.1 we provide a theoretical analysis of the 
trust game with endogenous leadership assuming F&S-preferences and that the preference 
parameters are common knowledge. The following proposition can be shown to hold:  
Proposition 1: If the trustee (second mover in the trust game) is sufficiently inequality 
averse 4/1≥jβ  there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) with maximal invest-
ment and maximal backtransfer and with player P choosing sequence P-First (voluntary 
leadership).  
Intuitively, since the trustee can always avoid unfavorable inequality, the backtransfer 
depends only on preference parameter jβ . Depending on jβ  the trustee will either recipro-
cate positive investment 0>ix  by choosing ij xy =  or will choose 0=jy . Then, if ij xy =  is 
anticipated by the investor (player i), maximal investment ix  is rational even for egoistic 
players ( 0== ii βα ). If the principal knows that the agent is sufficiently inequality averse 
he/she may choose to be investor. Alternatively, there also exists an SPE with maximal in-
vestment, maximal backtransfer and the sequence A-First. Furthermore, the benchmark solu-
tion (zero investment, zero backtransfer, any sequence) is also an SPE if inequality aversion is 
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sufficiently low. Thus, under complete information we can establish cooperative equilibria 
and voluntary leadership.  
If the preference parameters are not commonly known as it is the case in an experiment, 
investment is risky. The investor does not know the trustee’s parameter jβ  and cannot be sure 
about the backtransfer. If 10=ix  is chosen, the expected utility of a risk neutral investor is  
)40))((1(30)()( ii probprobUE αββ −−+=
−−
 
with )(β
−
prob  representing the investors subjective belief about the trustee being sufficiently 
inequality averse to choose 10=jy . Since )( iUE  is increasing in )(β
−
prob  and decreasing in 
iα  investment is more likely if the investor is more optimistic about the trustee being inequal-
ity averse, and investment is less likely if the investor is more averse against unfavorable ine-
quality. Consequently, the principal’s willingness to take voluntary leadership should also 
increase in )(β
−
prob  and decrease in iα .  
In addition one may wonder about the investor’s attitude toward risk. If investment is 
zero, backtransfer will be zero as well, so the investor will keep the endowment of 10 for sure. 
With positive investment the payoff will be either larger or smaller than 10. Therefore a larger 
degree of risk aversion reduces incentives to invest and the principal’s willingness to take 
voluntary leadership. With respect to the backtransfer one may argue that risk aversion does 
not matter, since the trustee is sure about the consequences of his choice. However, if the trus-
tee acknowledges that the investor had to bear more financial risk, an inequality averse player 
may consider it fair to compensate the investor for taking the risk (see Hypothesis 1). Note 
that in this paragraph we argue only partially along the F&S-model, since the F&S-model 
does not incorporate risk aversion. Furthermore, in our experiment we do not expect equilib-
rium behavior to occur necessarily. However, we find it instructive to derive qualitative pre-
dictions for investment and backtransfer based on social preferences and concern for risk. 
Following these theoretical arguments we formulate the following empirical hypothe-
ses: 
Hypothesis 2: Investment is smaller if the investor is more risk averse (Hyp. 2.a), if the 
 investor exhibits a stronger aversion against unfavorable inequality (Hyp. 2.b), and if 
 the investor has a lower subjective belief of an inequality averse trustee (Hyp. 2.c). 
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Hypothesis 3: Backtransfer is increasing in the trustee’s degree of favorable 
 inequality aversion. 
1.3.3  Control Treatment: Trust Game with Exogenous Leadership 
To investigate the influence of voluntary leadership (Hypothesis 1) we ran experimental 
sessions on the trust game with endogenous leadership and compare behavior under both se-
quences (P-First versus A-First). As explained above we interpret the choice of voluntary 
leadership as a signal of trust that leads to stronger reciprocation (higher backtransfer rate) 
than if the principal does not take leadership (and thus assigns the agent to be first mover in 
the trust game). A subtle question arising here is whether it is the choice of voluntary leader-
ship that is perceived as a signal of trust or whether it is the refusal of voluntary leadership 
that is perceived as a signal of distrust or non-cooperative attitude. In the latter case an agent 
who is mandated to make the first move might choose low investment leading to low back-
transfer. To discriminate the possibility of such a distrust-effect from the proposed trust-effect 
we ran a control treatment on a trust game with exogenous leadership. It is equivalent to the 
stages 2.a and 3.a of the trust game with endogenous leadership as described above (again 
with an endowment of 10 and payoff functions as above). The trust-effect should increase 
investment and backtransfer compared to the control treatment, while the distrust-effect 
should lower investment and backtransfer compared to the control treatment. 
1.4  Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was run in the experimental economics lab at the University of Erfurt. It 
comprised 10 sessions with groups of 20 participants each, and it was computerized using the 
software z-Tree (see Fischbacher, 2007). The participants were students from different fields 
(social sciences and humanities) and recruited via Orsee (Greiner 2004). Each participant 
played only a single game, so the experiment was truly one-shot. Players received written 
instructions, were randomly paired and interacted anonymously (instructions are provided in 
Appendix A.1.3). The trust game with endogenous leadership was applied in 8 sessions, and 
the control treatment (exogenous leadership) was applied in 2 sessions. We ran more sessions 
on the endogenous treatment to collect enough observations on voluntary leadership. Namely, 
we anticipated correctly that voluntary leadership is more often refused rather than chosen. 
After playing the trust game the participants played the lottery game of Holt and Laury 
(2002) to determine their degree of risk aversion and played the distribution game of Danne-
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berg et al. (2007) to determine their F&S-preference parameters iα  and iβ . The collection of 
both, the degree of risk aversion and the F&S-parameters, were incentivized. We will use 
these measures to test Hypotheses 2.a, 2.b and 3. Details on these procedures are provided in 
the Appendix. A.1.3. We also collected a measure of an individual’s trust in other persons or 
society as a whole as it is collected by the World Value Survey (2005).6 This measure may 
serve as a proxy for an investor’s subjective belief of a reciprocal choice of the trustee and 
will serve to test Hypothesis 2.c. The participants also filled in the 16-PA-personality ques-
tionnaire of Brandstätter (1988) and provided some socio-demographic characteristics (age, 
gender, etc.) to allow for additional individual control measures. Thus, all in all we have a 
number of incentivized and non-incentivized measures. The experimental procedures are 
summarized in Table 1.1. Sessions took about 50 minutes, subjects were paid anonymously, 
and average earnings were about 10 EUR.7 
 
Table 1.1: Overview about experimental procedures 
 
Treatment Sequence of Games Observations 
Endogenous 
Leadership 
1. Trust Game with Endogenous Leaderhip 
2. Holt/Laury Game, Danneberg et. al. Game 
3. Trust Question, 16-PA-Questionnaire, Socio-
Demographic Questionnaire 
8 Sessions 
80 Pairs 
160 Participants 
Exogenous 
Leadership 
1. Trust Game With Exogenous Leaderhip 
2. Holt/Laury Game, Danneberg et. al. Game 
3. Trust Question, 16-PA-Questionnaire, Socio-
Demographic Questionnaire 
2 Sessions 
20 Pairs 
40 Participants 
 
1.5  Empirical Results 
1.5.1  Descriptive Statistics and Simple Analyses 
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics of experimental decisions. Accordingly, in the 
trust game with endogenous leadership most principals decide for the sequencing A-First. 
However, 16 out of 80 principals (20%) choose voluntary leadership (P-First).   
                                                   
6 The question is: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people? Participants may answer “yes” or “no”. 
7 An average earning for a student job at the time of the experiment was about 8 EUR per hour.  
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Table 1.2.a.: Summary Statistics 
 
Treatment Investment 
x 
Backtransfer 
y 
Backtransfer  
Rate y/x 
# Obs. 
Endogenous 
Leadership 
P-First 
(Vol. Leadership) 
9.13 
(1.50) 
8.06 
(2.70) 
0.89 
(0.26) 16 
A-First 6.83 (3.09) 
5.19 
(3.09) 
0.88 
(0.64) 64 
Exogenous Leadership 5.40 (2.76) 
4.10 
(3.09) 
0.94 
(0.86) 20 
Notes: Table 1.2.a. includes means and standard deviations of investment, backtransfer and backtransfer rate by 
treatment. 
Table 1.2.b.: Summary Statistics 
 
Treatment Investment 
x 
Backtransfer 
y 
Backtransfer 
 Rate y/x 
# Obs. 
Endogenous 
Leadership 
P-First 
(Vol. Leadership) 
10.0 
(2.0) 
9.0 
(3.0) 
1.00 
(0.17) 16 
A-First 7.5 (5.75) 
5.0 
(4.75) 
1.00 
(0.50) 64 
Exogenous Leadership 5.0 (5.0) 
3.0 
(4.0) 
0.67 
(0.57) 20 
Notes: Table 1.2.b. includes medians and inter-quartil range of investment, backtransfer and backtransfer rate by 
treatment. 
Investment and backtransfer is higher in P-First than in A-First giving a first indication 
of support for Hypothesis 1. Means of investment and backtransfer are higher in the two en-
dogenous leadership conditions than under exogenous leadership. Variances are relatively 
large, so we also look at medians. Table 1.2.b confirms that median investments and median 
backtransfers are higher under endogenous leadership than exogenous leadership. According 
to pairwise Mann-Whitney-U-tests the differences in investment are highly statistically sig-
nificant for the comparison of P-First versus A-First and P-First versus exogenous leader-
ship. Differences between A-First and exogenous leaderhip are only significant at a 10% 
level. 
Table 1.3: Pairwise Mann-Whithney-U-tests of investment by treatments 
 
Mann-Whitney-U-Tests of Investment 
P-First versus A-First  p = 0.005, N = 80 
P-First versus Exogenous Leadership p < 0.001, N = 36 
A-First versus Exogenous Leadership p = 0.057, N = 84 
        Notes: P-values are calculated for two-tailed tests. 
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Figure 1.1 is a scatterplot of backtransfer against investment. It illustrates the joint dis-
tribution of backtransfers and investments, and it clearly indicates a positive correlation. Dif-
ferent dot sizes represent clustering of observations. The reference lines represent a quadratic 
regression of backtransfer on investment with a 95%-confidence band. Obviously, agents be-
have reciprocally, responding larger backtransfer for larger investment. The Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient between backtransfer and investment is positive and highly statistically 
significant (ρ = 0.449, p < 0.001, N = 100) giving robust support for the Trust-And-
Reciprocity mechanism. 
Figure 1.1: Scatterplott of backtransfer against investment 
 
 
Notes: Different dot sizes represent clustering of observations. Quadratic regression line included. 
 
1.5.2  Regression Analyses of Investment 
To investigate our hypotheses further we apply regression analyses controlling for the 
influence of social preferences, risk attitudes, personality characteristics, and other factors. 
Since Figure 1.1 also shows relatively large dispersion and that there is some clustering at the 
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upper bound of the decision interval, we don’t rely on OLS-regressions but apply median re-
gressions and tobit regressions analyses. Table 1.4 shows the results of different model speci-
fications for regressions of investment. Table 1.5 shows analogous analyses of the backtrans-
fer. Details on explanatory variables are provided in Appendix A.1.2. 
Model (1) in Table 1.4 reports the result of a median regression of investment.  
Table 1.4: Regressions Results of Regressions on Investment 
 
Dependent variable: Investment, Base category is P-First-exogenous 
 Model 1- Median Regression Model 2- Tobit Regression 
Variable Coefficient P-value  (two-tailed) Coefficient 
P-value  
(two-tailed) 
A-First endogenous 1.531 (0.265) 0.000 
1.215 
(0.947) 0.203 
P-First endogenous 4.107 (0.340) 0.000 
6.533 
(1.390) 0.000 
Alpha_High -2.249 (0.250) 0.000 
-1.435 
(0.888) 0.109 
Alpha-missing -0.836 (0.271) 0.003 
-1.473 
(0.966) 0.131 
Risk aversion -1.348 (0.227) 0.000 
-2.385 
(0.793) 0.003 
Risk loving 2.548 (0.518) 0.000 
4.085 
(2.384) 0.090 
Risk missing -2.409 (0.347) 0.000 
-2.578 
(1.412) 0.071 
Male 2.114 (0.224) 0.000 
3.014 
(0.848) 0.001 
WV survey trust 0.440 (0.209) 0.038 
1.223 
(0.767) 0.114 
 Self control 0.126 (0.094) 0.185 
0.258 
(0.344) 0.455 
Constant 5.410 (0.551) 0.000 
4.753 
(2.037) 0.022 
Number  of observa-
tions 
 
100 100 
pseudo R2 0.310 0.117 
Notes: Table includes regression results for investment as dependent variable. Columns 2 and 3 contain coeffi-
cients and two-tailed p-values of the median regression. Column 4 and 5 contain coefficients and two-tailed p-
values of the of tobit regression. Standard errors are included in parenthesis. 
Overall the model fits well showing a Pseudo R2 of 0.310. P-First and A-First are 0-1-
dummies for the two endogenous leadership conditions. Both coefficients are positive and 
significant confirming higher investment compared to the reference category (exogenous 
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leadership). Testing the coefficient of P-First against the coefficient of A-First shows also a 
highly significant difference (p < 0.001) supporting Hypothesis 1.a. 
In line with Hypotheses 2.b a higher level of unfavorable inequality aversion    
(Alpha_High) decreases investment compared to the reference category (low inequality aver-
sion).8 The estimated coefficient is negative and highly significant. Alpha_Missing is a nui-
sance variable coded as 1 (and otherwise 0) if a participant did not provide a consistent meas-
ure of α (21 out of 100 cases). We included this in order not to confuse the reference category 
(low inequality aversion). Risk attitudes also influence investment in the predicted direction 
(Hypothesis 2.a): The coefficient of Riskaverse_High is negative, and the coefficient of Risk-
loving is positive.9 The reference category is low riskaversion (including risk neutrality). Ris-
kaverse_Missing is included to control for missing measures of risk aversion (8 observations). 
In line with Hypothesis 2.c participants who show more trust in others according to the world 
value survey measure (variable Trusting) choose higher investment as well. 
Model (1) reports furthermore that male participants (variable Male) invest more than 
female. Self-Control is the only personality characteristic of those measured by the 16PA-
questionnaire which we kept in the regression. The coefficient is positive but not significant.10 
We decided to keep one of the 16-PA factors in order to retain at least on intervalscaled varia-
ble in the regression. All other variables in model (1) are dummy variables. Backward elimi-
nation of insignificant regressors applied to the five 16-PA factors lead to Self-Contol as the 
best predictor out of the given five. 
Model (2) is a Tobit regression using the same variables as model (1) and assuming for 
the dependent variable a lower bound of 0 and an upper bound of 10. It might be considered 
as a natural alternative for model specification, but it is less robust against outliers. The Tobit 
model qualitatively confirms model (1). All estimated coefficients show the same sign, but 
significance values differ. While the median regression model seems more adequate in our 
view, we will use the Tobit model later on for computing mean effect sizes. 
 
                                                   
8 Alpha_High is a dummy coded as 1 if the value of α is in the upper quartile of the distribution (above 0.3), and 
it is coded as 0 otherwise. 
9 Riskaversion_High is 1 if the value of riskaversion as measured by the Holt/Laury procedure is above 0.7 (31 
observations; about the upper 30%-percentile of the distribution). Otherwise it is 0. Riskloving is 1 if measured 
riskaversion is negative (otherwise 0). Only 3 participants were coded as riskloving. 
10 We decided to keep one of the 16-PA factors in order to retain at least on intervalscaled variable in the regres-
sion. All other variables in model (1) are dummy variables. Backward elimination of insignificant regressors 
applied to the five 16-PA factors lead to Self-Control as the best predictor out of the given five.  
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1.5.3  Regression Analyses of Backtransfer 
Model (3) in Table 1.5 is a median regression of backtransfer. The model fits well over-
all (Pseudo R2 = 0.284). All partial effects are significant. 
Table 1.5: Regression Results of Regressions on Backtransfer 
 
Dependent variable: Backtransfer, Base category is P-First-exogenous 
 Model 3- Median Regression Model 4 - Tobit Regression 
Variable Coefficient P-value  (two-tailed) Coefficient 
P-value  
(two-tailed) 
Investment 0.742 (0.050) 0.000 
0.604 
(0.132) 0.000 
A-First endogenous 1.067 (0.374) 0.005 
0.211 
(0.968) 0.828 
P-First endogenous 2.468 (0.494) 0.000 
2.719 
(1.358) 0.048 
Beta_High 1.086 (0.310) 0.001 
1.646 
(0.830) 0.050 
Beta_Missing 0.686 (0.393) 0.084 
1.172 
(1.045) 0.265 
Male -0.596 (0.311) 0.058 
-0.733 
(0.847) 0.389 
Emotional Stability 0.555 (0.111) 0.000 
0.338 
(0.288) 0.244 
Tough-Mindedness -0.390 (0.144) 0.008 
-0.246 
(0.378) 0.517 
Constant -1.719 (0.846) 0.045 
-0.427 
(2.291) 0.852 
Number  of observa-
tions 
 
100 100 
pseudo R2 0.284 0.077 
Notes: Table includes regression results for backtransfer as dependent variable. Columns 2 and 3 contain coeffi-
cients and two-tailed p-values of the median regression. Column 4 and 5 contain coefficients and two-tailed p-
values of the of tobit regression. Standard errors are included in parenthesis. 
As predicted backtransfer is increasing in Investment and in the trustee’s degree of fa-
vorable inequality aversion (Beta_High).11 Furthermore, backtransfer is higher under volun-
tary leadership (P-First) than under exogenous leadership (the reference category). Testing 
the coefficient of P-First against the coefficient of A-First shows also a highly significant 
difference (p = 0.005). These estimation results clearly support our hypotheses (Hyp. 1.b and 
                                                   
11 Beta_High is a dummy coded as 1 if the value of β  is above 0.05 and is coded as 0 otherwise. The reference 
category includes observations of 05.00 << β  Beta_Missing represents observations with inconsistent measures 
of β .  
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Hyp. 3). Backtransfer is smaller for male participants, and for those who score high on the 16-
PA factor Emotional Stability. The factor Tough-Mindedness enters negatively. The two (out 
of five) factors were retained after backward elimination of insignificant factors. Model (4) 
shows a Tobit regression with upper bounds 0 and 10 and using the same set of predictor 
variables. All effects show the same signs as in the median regression. 
1.6  Discussion and Conclusions 
Voluntary leadership increases investment and backtransfer in our trust game experi-
ment. The influence is shown as highly statistically significant in median regression analyses. 
Computing mean effect sizes12 we find that voluntary leadership (P-First) increases invest-
ment on average by 6.53 compared to the control group (exogenous leadership) and by 5.32 
compared to A-First. An investment of e.g. 7 induces an average backtransfer of 7.88 under 
voluntary leadership compared to 5.15 and 5.36 under exogenous leadership and A-First, re-
spectively. 
In a meta-study on trust game experiments Johnson and Mislin (2011), henceforth JM, 
report an average investment of 49.7% of the available amount with a standard deviation of 
14.3%. The average backtransfer is 36.8% of the available amount with a standard deviation 
of 11.5%. In the control treatment (exogenous leadership) of our experiment investments and 
backtransfer are somewhat higher than in JM, but within one standard deviation of the JM 
averages. One reason for this may be that backtransfers are tripled in our case so that there is 
an efficiency gain in both investment and backtransfer, whereas in JM backtransfer only 
serves to distribute earnings. More impressive, however, is the strong effect of voluntary 
leadership. Both average investment and average backtransfer are more than three standard 
deviations above the JM figures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
12 Here we rely on the Tobit regression models (2) and (4). 
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Table 1.6: Average Investment and Backtransfer Rates 
 
 Johnson, Mislin          Kleine, Königstein, Rozsnyoi 
  Exogenous 
Leadership 
Voluntary 
Leadership 
average investment rate 49.7% 
(14.3) 
50% 100% 
average backtransfer rate 36.8% 
(11.5) 
67% 90% 
Notes: Table displays a comparison of investment rates and backtransfer rates between Johnson and Mislin 
(2011) and our study here. The average investment rate (backtransfer rate) is calculated as average investment 
(backtransfer) divided by the average amount of money available for investment (backtransfer). 
 
In line with other trust game experiments backtransfer increases strongly and signifi-
cantly in investment. Voluntary leadership strengthens this Trust-And-Reciprocity mecha-
nism. We interpret voluntary leadership as a trust signal of the principal to the agent. Surpris-
ingly, investment and backtransfer are also higher under A-First compared to the control 
treatment (exogenous leadership). Thus, if the principal mandates the agent to make the first 
move in the trust game, this is not perceived by the agent as a signal of distrust or a non-
cooperative attitude of the principal. In turn this supports our conclusion of voluntary leader-
ship inducing a trust-effect rather than that the refusal of voluntary leadership is inducing a 
distrust-effect. 
Risk preferences and social preferences modify behavior in manners predicted by our 
rational choice considerations (Hypotheses 2.a, 2.b, and 3). Investment is lower for high lev-
els of risk aversion and high levels of unfavorable inequality aversion (α ). Backtransfer is 
larger for high levels of favorable inequality aversion ( β ). The FS-preferences of inequality 
aversion proved useful in deriving empirical predictions. Investment and backtransfer are fur-
thermore modified by individual characteristics like gender, the degree of trust in others and 
16-PA personality factors. 
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2  The Influence of Inequality Elimination    
 on Reciprocal Behavior 
2.1  Motivation 
In consideration of the literature on other regarding preferences the issue of inequality 
aversion and reciprocity has attracted growing attention. While inequality aversion in experi-
mental settings is defined as an aversion to unequal splits of payoffs for the participants, reci-
procity is either the reward of experienced kindness (positive reciprocity) or punishment of 
experienced unkindness (negative reciprocity). The latter is mostly documented in various 
ultimatum games. A first mover (henceforth proposer) makes an offer on the division of an 
overall endowment to a second mover (henceforth responder). This offer can be either accept-
ed or rejected. If the responder rejects, both of them get zero. Usually the proposer offers an 
unequal split so that he/she becomes better off than the responder who suffers from an unfa-
vorable inequality if he/she accepts.13 An offer that leads to inequality may be interpreted as 
unfair and as unkindness treatment.14  Since the unequal division of the endowment may trig-
ger negative reciprocity responders often reject unequal offers.15 Thus, in ultimatum games 
negative reciprocity is documented as a response to an offer which creates inequality. 
In contrast to the ultimatum game I investigate whether negative reciprocity can be doc-
umented if the proposer does not create – but even eliminates – inequality with his action. 
However, the elimination of inequality occurs at the responder’s cost which may trigger nega-
tive reciprocity. I created an experimental design where two players get an asymmetrical en-
dowment. The proposer, who receives a lower endowment, may eliminate the inequality at the 
first stage of the game. He/she cannot become better off than his opponent but he/she may 
realize an equal payoff for both players by reducing the responder’s payoff. At the second 
stage of the game the responder may punish the proposer for reducing his/her payoff. This 
situation is like an act of sabotage: the proposer may sabotage his/her opponent while the re-
sponder may execute a counterstrike. 
                                                   
13 (Un)favorable inequality occurs from a player i’s point of view if he receives a (lower) higher payoff than 
his/her opponent player j.  
14 The definition of (un)fair is in this study is as follows: A distribution is (un)fair if the players receive an 
(un)equal payoff.  
15 As summarized in Camerer (2003 p.49) “Offers of 40-50 percent are rarely rejected. Offers below 20 percent 
or so are rejected about half time.” Detailed results of ultimatum experiments are summarized in Camerer (2003 
p.48-59).  
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To the best of my knowledge there is only one similar experimental study. Charness and 
Rabin (2002 henceforth C&R) investigated reciprocal behavior in a series of experimental 
games. One of these games is the sequential two person game (henceforth Game 1) shown in 
Figure 2.1. The proposer may choose strategy A or B. After choosing strategy A the game 
ends. The realized payoffs are (100, 1000) where the first (second) number in the brackets 
always represents the proposer’s (responder’s) payoff. If the proposer chooses strategy B, the 
outcomes will be determined by the responder. He/she may choose strategy C or D. Strategy 
C leads to (75, 125) and strategy D leads to (125, 125). The game ends after the responder’s 
decision.16 A further game by C&R with the same structure is Game 2 shown in Figure 2.2. 
The strategy profiles (AC) and (AD) lead to (450, 900) while the strategy profile (BC) leads to 
(200, 400) and (BD) leads to (400, 400).17 The proposer can reduce or even eliminate unfa-
vorable inequality completely if he/she chooses strategy B without becoming better off than 
the responder. However, this implies heavy monetary losses for the responder as well as 
heavy efficiency losses. Both aspects may trigger negative reciprocity. The documented re-
sults of Game 1 (Game 2) are the following: 50% (15%) of the proposers choose strategy B 
and reduce unfavorable inequality with this decision. 33% (34%) of the responders reduce 
with strategy C and by doing so punish the proposer for choosing strategy B.18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
16 Strategy B can be interpreted as an action of sabotage since it leads to monetary losses for the responder. The 
responder may strike back if he/she chooses strategy C which leads to monetary losses for the proposer.  
17 The main difference between these games is that the proposer suffers from monetary losses in any case if 
he/she chooses strategy B. He/she can reduce the inequality with strategy B but he/she decreases his/her mone-
tary payoff, too. In Game 1, on the contrary, he/she can reduce the inequality and increase his/her monetary 
payoff at the same time by choosing strategy B.  
18 C&R choose the strategy method. Thus, the data further contains the responders’ reactions for cases where 
strategy A was chosen by proposer.  
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Figure 2.1: Game1 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Game 2 
 
 
 
Thus, C&R are the first to have documented negative reciprocity in a setting where a 
proposer eliminates unfavorable inequality at the responder’s cost. The proposer is punished 
although he/she just tries to enforce an equal outcome. However, negative reciprocity is com-
prehensible since the proposer reduces the opponent’s payoff as well as the overall outcome. 
Both these facts can be aspects of negative reciprocity so the question which of these facts is 
responsible for the documented negative reciprocity remains or how strong aspects are by 
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comparison. Besides, one must ask how robust the results of C&R are. The documented nega-
tive reciprocity may be enforced and induced by extraordinary differences in endowment, 
efficiency losses and payoff losses for the responder.19 
Keeping these problems in mind this study uses two further experimental games and can 
therefore serve as a robustness test concerning the results of C&R as wel as an investigation 
into the motives of negative reciprocity. 
2.2  Experimental Design 
The study comprises two sequential two-person experimental games which are hence-
forth called G100 and G150. The structure of these games is identical to those presented in 
section 2.1. 
In G100 the proposer chooses either strategy A or B. If he/she chooses strategy A the 
payoffs are (100, 200) and the game ends. If he/she chooses strategy B the payoffs will be 
determined by the opponent’s action. The responder chooses either strategy C or D. If he/she 
chooses strategy C, the payoffs are (100, 150) while the payoffs are (150, 150) if he/she de-
cides to choose strategy D. 
In G150 the proposer chooses either strategy A or B. If he/she chooses strategy A, the 
payoffs are (150, 200) and the game ends. If he/she chooses strategy B, payoffs will be deter-
mined by the opponent’s action. The responder chooses either strategy C or D. If he/she 
chooses strategy C, the payoffs are (100, 150). If he/she chooses strategy D, the payoffs are 
(150, 150). Thus, G100 and G150 are identical except the payoff for the proposer if strategy A 
is chosen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
19 Efficiency is defined in the study as the aggregated overall outcome of the players. 
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Figure 2.3: G100 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: G150 
 
 
There is, however, a fundamental difference between G100 and G150. For G100 the fol-
lowing holds: efficiency losses may only arise if the responder punishes the choice of strategy 
B – i. e., the responder chooses strategy C after observing strategy B. Thus, there is only one 
aspect which may trigger negative reciprocity: the desire to punish the proposer for reducing 
the responder’s payoff. In contrast the following holds for G150: efficiency losses arise in any 
case if the proposer chooses strategy B. Thus, two aspects may trigger negative reciprocity: 
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the first aspect is to punish the proposer for reducing the responder’s payoff while the second 
aspect is to punish the proposer for reducing the overall payoff. Thus, a comparison of the 
results of G100 and G150 makes it possible to distinguish between these different incentives 
of negative reciprocity. This is a major advantage of this study in comparison to C&R. Fur-
thermore, monetary losses for the responder and efficiency losses are not as high as in the 
games of C&R. Thus, these experimental games may serve as a robustness test of the results 
of C&R, too. 
2.3  Predictions of Behavior 
Besides payoff maximization monetary payoff further incentives may have an influence 
on behavior: the proposer may have preferences to maximize the overall payoff or to reduce 
the inequality. But these aspects may induce a trade off. Furthermore the proposer’s choice 
may trigger negative reciprocity. I apply outcome and intention based models to analyze 
G100 and G150. Calculations are shown in Appendix A.2.1. 
2.3.1  Predictions with Selfish Preferences20 
A selfish player maximizes his monetary payoff and does not care about the opponent’s 
payoff. Thus, a selfish responder is indifferent between strategies C and D. This holds for 
G100 as well as for G150. 
The proposer anticipates the responder’s consideration. Since both strategies C and D 
may be chosen with a positive likelihood the proposer’s expected payoff is higher than 100 
but lower than 150 if he/she chooses strategy B. If he/she chooses strategy A he/she receives 
100 (150) in G100 (G150). Thus, strategy B leads to a higher (lower) expected payoff than 
strategy A in G100 (G150).  
In summary: 
- the responder is indifferent between strategy C and D in G100 as well as in G150 
- strategy B is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G100  
- strategy A is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G150 
 
                                                   
20 The results of 2.3.1 are not calculated separately in the Appendix. However, the results and calculations for 
selfish players are identical to the calculations for inequality averse players with: 0== kk βα .  
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2.3.2  Predictions with Inequality Aversion 
Suppose that the social preferences of the players are well described by the model of 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999 henceforth F&S). Thus, the utility of a player i is given by:  
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with restrictions 10 <≤ iβ  and ii βα ≥ . The parameter ( iα ) iβ  represents the degree of ine-
quality aversion against (un)favorable inequality. The monetary payoffs are represented by iπ  
and jπ  while n is the number of players.  
Assume that the players are not selfish and have got some aversion against favorable as 
well as against unfavorable inequality – i.e. 0≠≥ kk βα
21.  
The responder’s choice does not influence his monetary payoff after observing strategy 
B, but choosing strategy C induces an inequality. In contrast choosing strategy D assures an 
equal payoff for both players. Thus, strategy C is dominated by strategy D. This holds for 
G100 as well as for G150. 
 The proposer anticipates that the responder is going to choose strategy D after observing 
strategy B. Thus the proposer can not suffer from choosing strategy B, but he/she can reduce 
the inequality. Hence strategy A is dominated by strategy B. 
In summary: 
- strategy D is the dominant strategy for the responder in G100 as well as in G150 
- strategy B is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G100 
- strategy B is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G150 
2.3.3  Predictions with Quasi-Maximin Preferences 
The quasi-maximin preferences were introduced by C&R. Suppose the utility function 
of player i is given by: 
 { }[ ])...()(,...,,min)(),...,,( NNiNiU πππδπππδλπλπππ +++⋅−+⋅+−≡ 212121 11  
                                                   
21 For 0== kk βα  the predictions are identical to the predictions with selfish preferences. 
  31 
 
)1( λ−  is the weighting factor that player i puts on his monetary payoff iπ  while [ ]1,0∈λ  is 
the weight that player i puts on the social good. The social good is a weighted average of the 
payoff of the worst off player and the aggregated payoff of all players. )1,0(∈δ  is the part 
that player i puts on worst off player`s payoff. This is the degree of the maximin preferences 
of player i. In contrast )1( δ−  is the part which player i puts on total-surplus maximization 
and can be interpreted as the degree of efficiency orientation.22  
Assume that players are not selfish – i.e., ( ]1,0∈λ .23  
Suppose that the responder observes strategy B. If the responder chooses strategy C in-
stead of strategy D he/she induces a lower overall payoff and a lower payoff of the worst off 
player than if he/she chooses strategy D. Thus, strategy C is dominated by strategy D. This 
holds for G100 as well as for G150. Furthermore, the proposer anticipates that the responder 
is going to choose strategy D after observing strategy B. Thus, the proposer anticipates that 
choosing strategy B leads to (150, 150). 
In G100 the proposer increases his/her payoff if he/she chooses strategy B. At the same 
time he/she increases with strategy B the worst off player’s payoff while the overall payoff is 
as high as choosing strategy A. Thus, strategy B is the dominant strategy. 
In G150 strategy B does not increase the proposer’s payoff. At the same time the worst 
off player’s payoff does not increase but the overall payoff is lower than when choosing strat-
egy A. Thus, strategy A is the dominant strategy. 
In summary: 
- strategy D is the dominant strategy for the responder in G100 as well as in G150 
- strategy B is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G100 
- strategy A is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G150 
 
 
 
                                                   
22 It is easy to see that the opponent’s payoff is always positively correlated with the payoff of  player i. That is a 
fundamental difference to the concept of inequality aversion. The parameter iα  in the model of F&S represents 
envy. However, envy does not exist in the model of quasi-maximin preferences. 
23 For 0=λ the predictions are identical to the predictions with selfish preferences. 
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2.3.4  Predictions with Quasi-Maximin Preferences and Reciprocity 
C&R extend the quasi-maximin preferences with reciprocity to capture the intention of 
opponent’s move. According to this negative reciprocity may arise if an opponent behaves 
selfishly – i.e., if he/she puts too little importance on the social good which is specified by the 
parameter λ . The right level of λ  – i. e., not to trigger negative reciprocity – is *λ  is called 
the selflessness standard.24 It is assumed that the selflessness standard is common knowledge 
and defined by C&R (p.855) as the follows: “ *λ -the weight they feel a decent person should 
put on social welfare“.25  
However the analysis of G100 and G150 with the advanced model of C&R leads to se-
rious problems.  
In G100 strategy B can be supported for any value of [ ]1,0∈λ .26 Thus, by observing 
strategy B the responder does not know whether the proposer has disregarded the right level 
of *λ  or not. He/she may have the belief that *λ  has been disregarded and punishes the pro-
poser although choosing strategy B is in line with efficiency and supports the worst off play-
er’s payoff, too. 
Choosing strategy B in G150 is not conform to any [ ]1,0∈λ . The model of C&R, how-
ever, is only defined for [ ]1,0∈λ . Since choosing strategy B only corresponds to a negative 
value of λ  it is not possible to ascertain whether the selflessness standard is violated. Fur-
thermore, we cannot assume that strategy B is consistent with either selfish or prosocial be-
havior. The proposer can only reduce his/her payoff by choosing strategy B so that strategy B 
does not correspond with selfish behavior. On the other hand the proposer can only reduce the 
social good by choosing strategy B so that strategy B does also not correspond with prosocial 
behavior. Hence, it is not possible to predict any response with this model for G150. 
2.3.5  Predictions with the Model of Falk and Fischbacher 
The theory of Falk and Fischbacher (2006 henceforth F&F) can be considered as an ad-
vanced F&S model.27 F&F measure an opponent’s kindness by comparing expected payoff 
                                                   
24 Positive reciprocity does not exist – i.e., putting more weight on the social good than λ  will not rewarded.  
25 Derivation and formulization of the quasi-maximin preferences with reciprocity is given in C&R. 
26 As shown in Appendix A.2.1.2.3 proposer is going to choose strategy B if )()( δλ −≥− 11 p . This condition 
may fulfilled by all [ ]1,0∈λ .  
27A detailed derivation and formalization of the model is given in Appendix A 2.1.3.1. 
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differences.28 Experienced kindness is rewarded while experienced unkindness is punished.29 
Roughly speaking the actions that support the opponent’s payoff and do not induce unfavora-
ble inequality from the opponent’s point of view are kind. Actions that do not support the op-
ponent’s payoff and induce unfavorable inequality form opponent`s point of view are unkind. 
The latter triggers negative reciprocity. The following constriction of the model is very im-
portant for G100 and G150: no action is kind if unfavorable inequality occurs. This holds 
even if the action increases the worse off player’s payoff. Furthermore, no action is unkind if 
favorable inequality occurs. This holds even if the action decreases the better off player’s 
payoff. 
Thus, we may conclude for the responder: because strategy B never leads to unfavorable 
inequality from the responder’s point of view the choice of strategy B is not an unkind move. 
Furthermore, the responder may even support his opponent’s payoff for reducing inequality. 
Thus, the responder has no incentive to punish the proposer at all. However, the responder 
might also be indifferent between strategy C and D since the choice of strategy B leads to 
monetary losses for him/her. Thus, observing strategy B may trigger callousness since the 
proposer does not support responder’s highest feasible possible payoff. Therefore, the re-
sponder either prefers strategy D or is indifferent.  
In G100 the proposer reduces the inequality by choosing strategy B. Furthermore, 
he/she can increase his/her payoff. Moreover: if he/she believes that the responder might 
choose strategy C he/she may interpret his/her opponent as being unkind and prefer strategy B 
to decrease the responder’s payoff even more. Thus, strategy B is dominant in this contest.  
In G150 the proposer may prefer strategy B because this move can reduce the inequali-
ty. Moreover, if the proposer believes that the responder is going to choose strategy C he/she 
may prefer strategy B to punish the opponent’s unkind behavior. If the responder, however, is 
going to choose strategy C the proposer receives a lower payoff with strategy B than with 
strategy A. Thus, the proposer may also prefer strategy A to avoid expected payoff losses. 
Hence, in G150 the model can explain the choice of strategy A as well as the choice of strate-
gy B. 
                                                   
28 Note that the expected payoffs depend on the beliefs. The expectations of player i about the payoffs depend on 
his/her believe about his/her opponent j’s strategy (first order belief) and on his/her believe about what j does 
believe about i’s strategy (second order belief). 
29 Note that “experienced” does not mean inevitably that the kindness has already been experienced in the sense 
of an action has already been performed. It is rather expected kindness. F&F determine even for the recipient in a 
dictator game the experienced kindness by second order beliefs. In this manner even latent kindness may be 
interpreted as experienced kindness. 
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In summary: 
- strategy D is either the dominant strategy for the responder or he/she may be in
 different between strategy C and D in G100 as well as in G150 
- strategy B is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G100 
- both strategies may be dominant for the proposer in G150 
2.4  Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in at the experimental economics lab at the Uni-
versity of Erfurt. The subjects were randomly invited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004). All sub-
jects were seated in cubicles and received written instructions. They wrote their answers on 
the instructions sheets. Since the strategy method was used to evaluate responders’ decisions 
all choices were made at the same time. The instructions sheets were collected after comple-
tion. While achieved payoffs have been calculated the subjects received a short questionnaire 
but did not receive any further payment for completing it.  
48 students of various disciplines participated in G100 and 48 more in G150. Subjects 
participated either in G100 or in G150 and only one time. However, only 92 observations 
were collected since four participants gave an answer that could not be assigned to one of the 
feasible strategies. Fortunately exactly 23 observations could be collected for the proposers as 
well as for the responders in G100 and in G150.  
Payoffs were denoted in points where the exchange rate was 20 points = 1 euro. Ses-
sions took about 30 minutes and average earnings were about 7.50 euro paid anonymously 
after the experiment. 
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2.5  Results and Conformity with the Behavior Predictions 
2.5.1  Results  
The results of G100 (G150) are illustrated in Figure 2.5 (Figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.5: Results of G100 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Results of G150 
 
 
  36 
 
2.5.2  Proposers’ Behavior 
In G100 all proposers (23 out of 23) choose strategy B. Thus, they increase their (ex-
pected) monetary payoff and reduce unfavorable inequality.  
In G150 four (19) out of 23 proposers choose strategy B (A). The majority prefers not to 
reduce unfavorable inequality but to maximize overall payoff. A Chi-Square test shows the 
hypotheses that there is no difference between the chosen strategies in G100 and G150 can be 
rejected. A 7,322 =χ  with df = 1 results in p < 0.001. 
The minority chooses strategy B preferring to reduce unfavorable inequality although 
their own monetary payoff does not increase and the overall payoff even decreases.  
2.5.3  Responders’ Behavior 
 In G100 all (23 out of 23) responders choose strategy D which leads to a redistribution 
of the endowments. Proposers and responders receive an equal payoff and no efficiency losses 
occur. Responder’s payoff losses do not trigger any negative reciprocity.  
 In G150 all (23 out of 23) responders choose strategy D so that a reduction of the ine-
quality arises accompanied with efficiency losses due to the responder’s payoff losses. How-
ever, the responder’s payoff losses – and even the reduced overall payoff – do not trigger neg-
ative reciprocity. 
 Thus, there is no negative reciprocity at all.  
2.5.4  Conformity with Predictions for Proposers’ Behavior 
 The explanatory power of the models differs for the proposer’s behavior. In G100 all 
proposers choose strategy B. This is in line with F&S, F&F and the quasi-maximin prefer-
ences of C&R.  
 In G150 4/23 (19/23) of the proposers choose strategy B (A). Since strategy B causes 
efficiency losses the quasi-maximin preferences predict solely the choice of strategy A. Thus, 
19/23 of the observations are in line with quasi-maximin preferences. 
 In contrast to quasi-maximin preferences F&S predict that the proposer prefers strategy 
B in G150. Thus, only 4/23 of the observations are in line with F&S. However, if we assume 
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that the responder might be a selfish type too, – i. e., for the responder might hold 0=≥ kk βα  
– the model of F&S performs better since a selfish responder is indifferent between strategy C 
and D. Thus, if the proposer cannot exclude that strategy C might be chosen his/her expected 
monetary payoff is lower for strategy B than for strategy A. Thus, the choice of strategy A 
may be a rational choice even for inequality averse proposers.30  
 The intention based model of F&F is able to explain the mixed observations in G150. If 
the proposer believes that the responder is unkind he/she may begrudge his/her opponent the 
highest feasible payoff and choose strategy B. Otherwise the proposer prefers strategy A 
which ensures him/her the highest possible monetary payoff. However, the predicting power 
of F&F for the proposer’s behavior is limited since the model may supports both strategies. 
2.5.5  Conformity with Predictions for Responders’ Behavior 
 All models of other regarding preferences introduced above support the observations in 
G100 as well as in G150.  
 The outcome based models of F&S support the results because punishing the proposer 
induces an inequality. The quasi-maximin preferences of C&R support the results because 
punishment induces efficiency losses and a decrease of worst off player`s payoff.  
 Also the intention based model of F&F is able to interpret observations but F&F offer a 
different approach: negative reciprocity is only accord with experienced unkindness. The pro-
poser never behaves unkind since he/she just eliminates an inequality and does not become 
better off as the responder. The latter is a necessary condition to trigger negative reciprocity. 
Since eliminating unfavorable inequality is not unkind the responder shows sympathy for 
his/her worst off opponent and does not reciprocate negatively. Whether the proposer takes 
money away from his opponent or only destroys a part of responder’s endowment does not 
matter. As long as the worst off proposer does not become better off negative reciprocity will 
not triggered. 
 
 
                                                   
30 See for that the condition )/( ppi −≥ 1α  in Appendix A.2.1.1.4.  
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2.6  Discussion and Conclusions 
 This study provides new findings about the (dis)appearance of negative reciprocity. 
These findings are even more interesting since they are not in line with the results of the simi-
lar study by C&R.  
 G100 is just a modified take game. If a proposer takes money away from a responder, a 
reallocation of the overall endowment can be realized if the responder does not punish his/her 
opponent. In fact all proposers take money away from the responder to equalize the unfavora-
ble inequality and all the responders accept this without punishing proposer. 
 G150 is not a classic take game since taking money away from responder cannot induce 
a reallocation of the overall endowment. It just destroys a part of the responder’s endowment. 
Thus, G150 is very similar to the structure of Game 1 and Game 2 investigated by C&R. In 
contrast to the results of C&R not one single observation of negative reciprocity is document-
ed in G150. Thus, the study of C&R fails this robustness test. The negative reciprocity docu-
mented by C&R seems to be something an artifact triggered by the extraordinary high losses 
for the responder. 
 Careful note should be taken that not even one observations of negative reciprocity is 
documented in G100 and G150 while the similar study of C&R documents that about 1/3 of 
the responders show negative reciprocity. Furthermore, none of the presented models about 
other regarding preferences predict negative reciprocity. Thus, the observations of G100 and 
G150 are in line with behavioral theory. However, one has to keep in mind that the approach-
es of these models are different. According to F&S punishment – i.e negative reciprocity – is 
not observed because it would induce inequality. According to the quasi-maximin preferences 
there is no negative reciprocity because it would induce efficiency losses and losses for the 
worst off player. According to the intention based approach of F&F negative reciprocity is not 
triggered because the proposer just balances an unfavorable inequality. The study cannot con-
clusively clarify which of these approaches is responsible for the observed behavior. Howev-
er, recent experimental evidences suggest that the intention is crucial for a response which is 
favors the approach of F&F.31 
 Finally the question of why C&R have documented negative reciprocity in their study 
remains. To the best of knowledge no behavioral model is able to explain the documented 
                                                   
31 See the importance of intention in Falk et al. (2003), (2008) and McCabe et al. (2003). 
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negative reciprocity of C&R as well as the non-existence of negative reciprocity documented 
above. As shown in Appendix A.2.1 the theories of F&S, C&R and F&F do not predict nega-
tive reciprocity for Game 1 and Game 2.32 Thus, the documented negative reciprocity of C&R 
is not robust and seems to be enforced by enormous monetary losses for the responder. 
  
                                                   
32The model of C&R with reciprocity introduced in 2.3.4 is able to explain the documented negative reciprocity 
in Game 1. Since strategy B may induce an increase in the proposer’s payoff and reduces the overall outcome at 
the same time the selflessness standard can be violated. This may trigger negative reciprocity. However, the 
model cannot explain the negative reciprocity in Game 2. Choosing strategy B does not conform to any [ ]1,0∈λ . 
Thus, we do not know whether the selflessness standard is violated and we cannot make any prediction. 
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3  Heterogeneous Agents, Incentives, Self-Selection   
 and Group Performance 
3.1  Introduction 
Organizing work in teams may be beneficial for organizations since teams can be more 
productive than individuals. But teams might suffer from shirking incentives if work effort 
cannot be fully controlled. The employer (principal) might wonder whether effort in teams 
(agents) can be increased by monetary incentives. Furthermore, if there is self-selection – i.e., 
agents choose themselves whether to work in a team or individually – the principal might 
wonder whether this leads the “right” agents to join teams, i.e. agents that have high team 
productivity and are cooperative; or whether it invites the “wrong” agents, i.e. agents that 
have low team productivity and/or are egoistic. These questions are addressed in our experi-
mental study.  
3.2  Related Literature 
As shown by Hardin (1968) and Olson (1968) free riding is the main dilemma for effi-
ciency of teams. In situations well described by public good games not to contribute to the 
public good is a dominant strategy for selfish players. This might be a serious dilemma in 
principal-agent relationships too. If the agents’ wage is determined by group performance and 
is divided equally between them, free riding – i.e., not to contribute with positive effort – is 
the dominant strategy.  
Nevertheless, positive contribution to the public good is documented in a lot of experi-
mental studies. Marwell and Ames (1979) (1980) (1981) have done pioneering work in that 
field by investigating systematically which determinants are crucial for positive contributions 
to the public good. However, the contribution level is mostly far from being efficient. This is 
documented by Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) too, who were the first to investigate team-
work incentives under different payment schemes.  
However, effort level is influenced by many aspects. Group composition and voluntari-
ness of being in a group may have significant influence on group performance. Keser and 
Montmarquette (2011) compared voluntary and enforced teamwork in heterogeneous and 
homogeneous groups. Participants might choose between group tasks and private tasks. Ho-
mogeneous (heterogeneous) groups contain workers with the same (different) productivity. 
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The effort level in voluntary homogeneous groups is the highest. Furthermore, effort in volun-
tary homogeneous groups is significantly higher than in enforced groups. In heterogeneous 
groups the effort level does not differ significantly between enforced and voluntary groups. 
As summarized by Keser and Montmarquette (p.298): “In general, voluntary team effort will 
be higher than enforced team effort. The effect is likely to be the stronger the less heteroge-
neity there is.” 
Fellner et al. (2010) documented that contribution may increase in heterogeneous 
groups depending on being informed about the teammates’ type and the amount of their con-
tribution. Types with low productivity – i.e., with low marginal per-capita return (MPCR) – 
contribute more than high types if the heterogeneity is common knowledge and contributions 
cannot be linked to types. Fischer et al. (1995) documented similar behavior. In mixed groups 
high (low) types contribute less (more) than in homogeneous groups. This evidence that espe-
cially types with high MPCR contribute less effort in heterogeneous groups is alarming for 
any principal-agent relationship because types with high MPCR are more productive so that 
their effort in practicular should be high as possible.  
Further studies deal with the selection into group task versus individual task. Abeler et 
al. (2005) documented that effort is significantly higher when receiving individual wages than 
when receiving group wages which are shared equally amongst the team members. Vandegrift 
and Yavas (2010) found no significant difference in performance between team production 
and individual piece rate. Moreover, Hamilton et al. (2003) documented in a field study that 
high-productivity workers prefer group tasks over individual tasks.  
 The principal may have a positive influence on the agents’ performance in groups, even 
if a hold-up problem arises – i.e., if the principal cannot enforce positive effort after making 
payment to agents. This approach goes back to Akerlof (1982) and has been documented in 
several experiments on the gift-exchange game in which a principal makes a payment to an 
agent. After receiving payment the agent can reciprocate with positive effort. However, the 
principal has no enforcement power so that he relies on the agent’s other regarding prefer-
ences. Nevertheless, payment level and effort level are positively correlated. These findings 
are robust even for one-employer–multi-worker cases as documented by Maximiano et al. 
(2007). 
Reciprocity in principal-agent relationships is documented even if agents’ payoffs are 
determined directly by their performance. Meidinger et al. (2003) designed an experimental 
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setting with one principal and two agents. The principal may offer two kinds of incentive con-
tracts. The contract which ensures the principal high (low) positive payment ensures the 
agents low (high) positive payment. If both agents reject the principal’s offer, all three receive 
zero. Otherwise the contract is accepted and the agents have to make an effort in a group task. 
The group task is designed as a prisoner’s dilemma. If the principal offers the more adverse 
contract from the agent’s point of view, more than 50% reject the offered contract although. 
Furthermore, cooperation between agents is lower (higher) if the adverse (advantageous) con-
tract is accepted. The study also investigates the influence of heterogeneity – i.e., the experi-
ment was run with groups containing one low and one highly productive agent. The reported 
findings of homogeneous groups hold true for heterogeneous groups, too. However, the coop-
eration rate in homogeneous groups is higher than in heterogeneous groups. Thus, the princi-
pal may have a positive influence on effort level and can induce a higher level of cooperation 
between agents with high payment even the heterogeneous group has a negative influence on 
effort level.  
A similar experiment with one principal and two agents was conducted by Cabrales and 
Charness (2011). Agents may be either high or low productive types. The probability for be-
ing a high or low productive type is equal high and types are private knowledge. The principal 
offers one out of three available contracts to his/her agents. The contract which ensures 
him/her the highest (lowest) payment ensures the agents the lowest (highest) payment. If ei-
ther agent vetoes the offered contract, all players receive an equally high payment and the 
game ends. Otherwise the contract is accepted and the agents have to work together in a group 
task. The group task is designed as a prisoner’s dilemma. The more adverse the offered con-
tract for the agents the higher the rejection rate is. Furthermore, low productive types more 
often reject than high productive types and the probability of vetoing a contract is higher if the 
teammate has rejected an offered contract in the period before.  
Königstein and Ruchala (2007) introduced a principal agent game with a group and an 
individual task.33 They ran two treatments. In one of the treatments the agents are equally 
productive while in the second treatment the agents are highly or low productive. The princi-
pal may offer a contract for an individual task or for a group task. The group task is designed 
as a standard public good game. The principal may vary the return share and fixed wages of 
the offered contracts. The results show that the principal may increase the probability for se-
lecting the group as well as the effort level in groups by offering a high return share for the 
                                                   
33 Ruchala is the unmarried name of Lünser. Gabriele K. Lünser is co-author of this chapter.  
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group task. Furthermore, the agents’ productivity influences the selection into group task and 
the chosen effort, too. The group task is chosen more often in the session with homogeneous 
agents. Furthermore, in a heterogeneous population the agents with high productivity provide 
higher effort levels than low productive types. 
3.3  Motivation 
Our principal-agent game contains one principal and 16 agents. The agents can choose 
either a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) or no task (exit option). The group task has 
the structure of a public good game between four agents, so there are incentives to shirk by 
not providing effort in GT. Group return is splitting between the four team members and the 
principal according to a linear pay contract (GT-contract) that has been offered by the princi-
pal before the agents’ choices of task. Alternatively, if agents choose IT they subsequently 
choose a productive effort resulting in an individual return which is splitting according to the 
IT-contract. The latter contract, as the GT-contract, is linear, comprising a fixed wage and a 
return share.  
This game has been studied before in Königstein and Ruchala (2007) for homogenous 
population of agents as well as for heterogeneous population of agents. Under heterogeneity 
the agents differ with respect to their productivity in GT. We implement a new variant of the 
game by introducing observability of productivity types. Before the team members make their 
choice of effort in GT they are informed about all team members’ productivities. This treat-
ment, which differs from Königstein and Ruchala (2007) where types were unknown to team 
members, allows the agents to discriminate their effort with respect to the teams productivity. 
As a consequence it might lead to stronger separation of player types between tasks. 
We use the social preference model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as a workhorse to pro-
vide empirical predictions regarding the influence of contracts and productivity on task selec-
tion and effort in GT. The standard preference model of neoclassical economics is of no help 
here. It predicts zero effort in GT and no choice of GT at all, but these predictions are rejected 
right away by tons of data on public good experiments. Cooperation in public good games is 
predicted by several models of social preferences. We rely on the Fehr-Schmidt model for 
reasons of tractability. Comparing this model with other social preference models is not 
within the scope of our study. 
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Our main hypotheses are, first, that the principal can positively influence effort in GT 
by offering higher return shares. Second, we predict that effort increase in team productivity. 
Finally, we predict that self-selection into GT depends on productivity and can be positively 
influence by the terms of the GT-contract. Overall, the compound hypothesis of social prefer-
ences and rational play results in structural variables (monetary incentives and productivity) 
having strategic value which they don’t have under standard neoclassical preferences. 
The paper continues as follows: Next we describe the experimental game in detail (sec-
tion 3.4), and provide theoretical analyses and empirical hypotheses (section 3.5). Then we 
report experimental procedure (section 3.6) and empirical results (section 3.7). The final sec-
tion summarizes findings and has concluding remarks. 
3.4  Experimental Game 
 The experimental game is the same as introduced by Königstein and Ruchala (2007).34 
Consider a principal-agent-game with one principal (manager) and 16 agents (indexed below 
by j = (1, 2, ..., 16)). Work of agents can be organized either in individual tasks (IT) or in 
group tasks (GT). Productivities of agents differ between tasks and agents. Half of the agents 
are high productive the others low productive. The proportion of high and low productive 
agents is common knowledge while actual productivity is privately known. High productive 
agents have a productivity of 7.5 in GT. Low productive agents have a productivity of 2.5 in 
GT. We also refer to these players as high types (HT) or low types (LT). In IT both types of 
players have the same productivity of 3. Thus low productive agents are relatively high pro-
ductive in IT and high productive agents are relatively high productive in GT. 
 The principal offers two linear pay contracts, one for IT and one for GT. The agents can 
choose one of these contracts or reject both. Effort in IT results in an observable, individual 
return. In GT workers are organized in groups of four. The effort choices of the four team 
members determine the joint return (group return). Prior to effort choices in GT the workers 
are informed about all team members’ productivities.35 The game is played over 10 periods. 
In each period the principal offers new pay contracts, each agent selects a task and chooses 
effort. The stages of the game are now described in detail.  
                                                   
34 The description of the game is taken from Königstein and Ruchala (2007). Thus, this part is similar to 
Königstein and Ruchala (2007). 
35 This differs from Königstein and Ruchala (2007) where the game is the same but productivities of the team 
members are not observable. 
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 Stage 1: The principal offers linear pay contracts for IT ),( ITITIT sfw =  and GT 
),( GTGTGT sfw = . Each contracts comprises a fixed wage ITf , GTf  and a return share ITs , 
GTs . Fixed wages and return shares are restricted as follows: 
 
 { }%100%,...,10%,0, ∈
GTIT ss  
 { }15,...,14,15, +−−∈
GTIT ff  
 
 Stage 2: Each agent may choose one of the tasks (IT or GT) which means that he or she 
accepts the terms of the contract. If the agent neither accept ITw nor GTw he or she decides for 
the exit option where he or she earns nothing in this period. If ITw is accepted, the agent 
works individually and will be paid according to ITw . Accepting GTw doesn’t ensure that an 
agent will work in a group. Since agents are matched in teams of four, accepting GTw is a pre-
liminary decision. Those agents who cannot be matched are asked for an alternative (final) 
choice of either IT or the exit option. 
 Stage 3a: Agents j who decided for IT choose individual work effort { }10,...,1,0∈je . 
Work effort is associated with the cost function jj eec 2)( = . The individual return in IT is de-
termined by j
IT
j er 3= . 
 Stage 3b: Agents j who decided for GT are informed about the productivities of their 
group members. Then they choose individual work effort { }10,...,1,0∈je . Work effort is asso-
ciated with the cost function jj eec 2=)( . The joint return in GT of group k is determined by: 
 ∑
=
=
4
1l
ll
GT
k eqr . 
GT
kr  is a weighted sum of efforts of all group members with weights 
{ } 1,2,...,16j  .,. =∀∈ 5752jq  given by the individual productivity parameters. Individual pro-
ductivity jq  is determined at the beginning of the game, is privately known and stays constant 
throughout all 10 periods. Payoffs of agents are determined as follows: 
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In IT: 
 )( j
IT
j
ITITIT
j ecrsf −+=Π . 
In GT: 
 
)(
4
1
j
GT
k
GTGTGT
j ecrsf −+=Π  
for all members j of team k. If the exit option is chosen j’s payoff is 0. The principal’s payoff 
is determined as follows. He or she has to pay fixed wages to all agents in IT and GT and col-
lects residual returns. Thus the principal earns 
 
( ) ( )∑∑
∈∈
−−+−−=Π
GTk
GTGT
k
GT
ITj
ITIT
j
IT
P frsfrs 4)1()1(   
with ITj∈ representing an agent who has chosen IT and with GTk ∈ representing a group of 
four agents who have chosen GT. 
 All subjects were informed that roles of players are randomly chosen and that roles as 
well as types of productivity are fixed for all ten periods. Furthermore all subjects know that 
they were playing a repeated game with a single principal facing 16 agents and that groups in 
GT were formed randomly in each period. The disclosure of productivities of team members 
was such that agents could not identify each other by player number or otherwise. Thus, they 
could not track each other’s productivity or past choices. 
3.5  Theoretical Analysis and Behavioral Hypotheses 
We describe in an intuitive manner theoretical solutions to the game from the perspec-
tive of efficiency as well as individual rationality conditional on egoistic or social preferences. 
A more detailed analysis can be found in Königstein and Ruchala (2007).  
The efficient solution of the game mandates low type agents to choose IT and provide 
maximal effort and high type agents to choose GT and provide maximal effort. To see this 
note that marginal productivities are higher than marginal cost at all effort levels, that the low 
type agent is more productive in IT than in GT and that this is vice versa for the high type 
agent. These choices maximize the joint payoff of the principal and all agents together and 
this payoff could be distributed evenly or unevenly by an appropriate choice of the contract. 
However, this collectively optimal outcome cannot be reached under individual rationality if 
  48 
 
players have egoistic preferences. Namely, as in any public good game it is not rational to 
contribute positive effort in GT. Therefore, effort in GT will be zero no matter how strong 
monetary incentives GTs  are, and the principal should not offer a positive fixed wage GTf . 
The best that the principal may do is to induce all agents to choose IT and provide maximal 
effort. This can be reached by a contract that satisfies 32 /≥ITs  (incentive compatibility con-
straint) and ITIT sf 3020 −≥  (participation constraint). 
This solution follows from the standard assumption of economics of egoistic and ra-
tional players. However, social preference models offer an alternative that is able to explain 
cooperation in public good games like in our group task. Assuming social preferences of the 
Fehr-Schmidt36 type (1999 henceforth F&S):  
{ } { }∑∑
≠
−
≠
− −−−−=
n
ji
ijnj
n
ji
jinjjjU 00 1111 ,max,max ππβππαπ  
with restrictions 10 <≤ jβ  and jj βα ≥ . The parameter ( jα ) jβ  represents the degree of 
inequality aversion against (un)favorable inequality. Monetary payoffs are represented by jπ
and iπ  while n is the number of players.  
Königstein and Ruchala (2007 p. 28) have already shown in their proposition 2: “If a 
group consists of two high productive agents 
2
15=jq  and two low productive agents 25=jq , 
there exists a SPE with 10* =je  for all 4,3,2,1=j  if agents are sufficiently inequality averse. 
Here, the proposed solution requires 1611=jβ  for low productivity agents and 161=jβ  for high 
productivity agents.” 
We extend this proposition to: 
Proposition 1: Given that all group members are sufficiently inequality averse, the 
 dominant strategy for all j = 1,2,3,4 within a group is to provide 10=∗je    
 if GTjj s
q
8
1−≥β . The principal can induce these choices by 
j
jGT
q
s
)( β−
≥
18
.37 
                                                   
36 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
37 It is obvious that the agents have only incentives to choose group task if the principal makes the contract for 
individual task sufficiently unattractive and if GTf  is high enough to earn at least just a positive payoff. Proof of 
the proposition is provided in Appendix A.3.1. 
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These conditions show that cooperation is reached more easily among highly productive 
types, if players are inequality averse and if monetary incentives are stronger. Thus, contrary 
to the benchmark solution with egoistic preferences the solution with F&S-preferences pre-
dicts that the principal’s design of the GT-contract has strategic value: Team production may 
vary with incentives. Specifically, our empirical hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1.a: In GT a higher return share GTs  offered by the principal induces 
 higher effort. 
Hypothesis 1.b: In GT effort of high productive types is larger than that of low  
 productive types. 
Hypothesis 1.c: Effort in GT is positively correlated with the degree of inequality 
 aversion. 
The influence of the second payoff variable, the fixed wage, is less clear. On the one 
hand changes in GTf  leave payoff differences between team members unaffected for all ef-
fort choices. Therefore, GTf should have no influence on effort in GT. On the other hand, the 
solution proposed by Königstein and Ruchala (2007) assumes that considerations of equality 
are taken only with respect to other team members but not with respect to the principal. If 
however, the participants in the experiment consider the principal’s payoff as well, they might 
respond higher fixed wages by reciprocally choosing higher effort. An additional complica-
tion is that fixed wage and return share should be correlated negatively. This is predicted 
theoretically via the participation constraint and it will in fact hold empirically. For these rea-
sons we do not propose a clear influence of GTf of effort in GT. 
Since Hypothesis 1 proposes positive effort in GT this should affect the choice of task 
as well. The agent’s choice of task is not necessarily IT as predicted for egoistic players but it 
may be GT. Specifically, it depends on expected earnings under both tasks and thus it depends 
on fixed wage, return share and productivity type. 
Hypothesis 2.a: GT is chosen more likely the higher the offered GT-payment is and the 
 lower the offered IT-payment is. Offered payments depend on both, fixed wages and 
 return shares. 
Hypothesis 2.b: GT is chosen more likely by high productive types than by low  
 productive types. 
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Hypothesis 2.c: The probability of choosing GT is positively correlated with the degree 
 of inequality aversion. 
Hypotheses 1.a, 1.b, 2.a and 2.b were also investigated in Königstein and Ruchala 
(2007). They did not study 1.c and 2.c since they did not take measures of inequality aversion. 
Furthermore, a novel feature of our design here is that the team members observe each other’s 
productivity type before choosing effort. This allows agents to discriminate their effort choice 
with respect to the average productivity of the team. Consequently, under observable types it 
will be more difficult for low productive types to successfully join teams than under non-
observable types. Therefore we predict a stronger, and thus more efficient, separation of types 
in our experiment than under non-observable types as in Königstein and Ruchala (2007). 
Hypothesis 3: Separation of productivity types is stronger here than in Königstein and 
 Ruchala (2007) in the sense that of all agents who choose GT the proportion of low 
 types vs. high types is smaller here than in Königstein and Ruchala (2007). 
Hypotheses 1 to 3 are our main behavioral hypotheses. It should be mentioned that our 
experiment is not intended to test and propose the F&S-preference model against other social 
preference models. Cooperation in public good games is also predicted by other social prefer-
ence models. Showing which one is more successful is not within the scope of our study. We 
rather rely on the F&S-model as a workhorse. The mere fact that social preferences can gen-
erate cooperation (if preference parameters are chosen appropriately) is an important step 
forward compared to standard neoclassical preferences. Namely, the influence of structural 
variables like monetary incentives may change with changes in preferences and it makes little 
sense to assume preferences that are immediately refuted by the data as it is the case with 
standard neoclassical preferences.  
3.6  Experimental Procedures 
 The experiment was conducted at the experimental economics lab at the University of 
Erfurt. It was computerized by using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and all partici-
pants are recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In total 153 students of various disciplines 
participated in the experiment. Each student participated only in one session. In the laboratory 
participants were separated by cabins. They received written instructions and examples to 
ensure that they had understood the rules of the game.  
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 Participants were randomly and anonymously assigned to one of the roles. Roles were 
labelled “participant A” for the principal, “participant B” for agents with low productivity and 
“participant C” for agents with high productivity. The game was played according to the rules 
described above. At the end of each period the period payoffs were calculated by the com-
puter program and displayed on screen. Agents were informed about their own payoff and 
group return of their own team. The principal was informed about task selection as well as all 
return resulting from IT and GT. Payoffs were shown in points and the exchange rate of EUR 
and points was commonly known. The exchange rate was 1 euro per 100 points for the prin-
cipal and 1 euro per 10 points for agents. Show-up fees were 0.5 euro for the principal and 5 
euro for agents. 38 
 After the participants had played the game we ran additional experiments and used 
questionnaires to collect additional data on individual characteristics. We elicit social prefer-
ences as proposed by Danneberg et al. (2007) and risk preferences as proposed by Holt and 
Laury (2002). Both elicitation mechanisms were incentivized. Screenshots of the procedure as 
well as the instructions of the game are attached to Appendix A.3.3. Finally, the participants 
had to fill out the 16-PA personality questionnaire of Brandstätter (1988) and some questions 
about socio-demographics (gender, age, etc.). 
Sessions took about one hour and 45 minutes. Average earnings where about 15 €. De-
cisions were taken privately and payments were made such that subjects did not see each 
other’s payments.  
3.7  Empirical Results 
3.7.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the collected experimental data. Since the game had 
10 periods and we ran 9 sessions we collected a total of 90 principal decisions and 1440 agent 
decisions. The majority of agents decided for the group task rather than the individual task or 
none. Effort in GT is positive and is on average about 4.5. Contract design is such that the 
four contract variables are correlated. Table 3.2 shows Spearman rank correlation coefficients. 
Specifically, return share and fixed wage in GT as well as return share and fixed wage in IT 
are negatively and highly significantly correlated. This should be expected from a theoretical 
                                                   
38 The experimental procedures of the principal agent game are almost the same as in Königstein and Ruchala 
(2007). Thus, the description is partially taken from there. 
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viewpoint. It has to be taken into account later since it may lead to multicollinearity in regres-
sion analyses. Return shares of the two tasks and both fixed wages are positively but not sig-
nificantly correlated.  
 
Table 3.1: Overview of Experimental Data 
 
Number of Periods  10  
Number of Principal Choices Contract Design 90  
Number of Agent Choices Task Choice, Effort 1440  
Contract Design 
(Mean, Std. Dev.) 
Return Share GT 63.6% (27.3) 
Fixed Wage GT -0.8 (7.8) 
Return Share IT 69.3% (22.1) 
Fixed Wage IT -2.5 (7.1) 
Choice of Task 
(Freq.) 
Group Task (GT) 928  
Individual Task (IT) 370  
None (Exit Option) 142  
Effort 
(Mean, Std. Dev.) 
Group Task (GT) 4.511 (3.084) 
Individual Task (IT) 5.831 (3.410) 
 
Table 3.2: Correlations of Contract Variables 
 
Correlation Spearman’s Rho P-Value 
Return Share GT ~ Fixed Wage GT -0.534 0.000 
Return Share IT ~ Fixed Wage IT -0.483 0.000 
Return Share GT ~ Return Share IT 0.139 0.192 
Fixed Wage GT ~ Fixed Wage IT 0.167 0.116 
  N = 90 
 
3.7.2  Effort in GT 
We now look at effort in GT. As expected a substantial fraction of the participants 
choose GT and provide positive effort in teams. Figure 3.1 shows frequency distributions 
separately for high productive types and low productive types (Fig. 3.1.a), and furthermore 
separately for teams of different levels of average productivity (Fig. 3.1.b). While it seems 
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that effort increases in average team productivity (see Figure 3.1.b), a difference between high 
and low types can hardly be detected (see Figure 3.1.a). 
Figure 3.1.a: Effort in GT by agent’s productivity type 
 
 
Figure 3.1.b: Effort in GT by average productivity of teams 
 
 
 
To gain a more accurate view we have to control for other influencing factors. This is 
done in a regression analysis reported in Table 3.3. It is a Tobit regression analysis on effort 
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choice in GT as dependent variable with lower bound 0 and upper bound 10. The influence of 
return share, fixed wage and productivity was estimated separately for symmetric teams – i.e., 
all four team members have the same productivity – and asymmetric teams. In asymmetric 
teams the variables return share, fixed wage, team productivity and a dummy for asymmetric 
teams (the reference category are symmetric and highly productive teams) are highly statisti-
cally significant.39  
Result 1.a and 1.b: The influences of return share and productivity clearly support 
 Hypotheses 1.a and 1.b. 
For symmetric teams neither the return share nor the fixed wage have a significant in-
fluence. But this hardly weakens Results 1.a and 1.b for two reasons: First, insignificance 
does not mean that Results 1.a and 1.b are wrong but just that they don’t hold for all sub-
groups. Second, symmetric teams comprise only a small fraction (6.5%) of all teams. We will 
look at the influence of incentives in symmetric teams in more detail below. Symmetric teams 
of low productivity provide significantly lower effort than symmetric teams of high produc-
tivity (see dummy low team productivity). Furthermore there is a decrease in provision of 
effort over time (see the influence of period).  
To illustrate the results we estimated a revised version of model 1 eliminating the insig-
nificant regressors return share and fixed wage for symmetric teams (see Table A.3.2 in Ap-
pendix A.3.2). Relying on this regression model Figure 3.2 shows predicted values of effort in 
GT for different levels of the return share and for different teams. Accordingly, symmetric 
teams with high average productivity of 7.5 provide higher effort than all other teams and do 
so independent of the offered return share. Average effort is about 7. This is different for 
asymmetric teams. These teams have an average productivity of 3.75, 5.0 or 6.25, and effort 
responds strongly to changes in return share GTs ; at low return share levels effort is close to 
minimal; at high return share levels effort is about 6. The predicted effort lines are ordered 
according to productivity which illustrates that effort is positively correlated with average 
productivity of the team. Finally, the predicted effort line is flat for symmetric teams of low 
productivity (productivity = 2.5). At high return share levels 60.>GTs  predicted effort in 
these teams is lowest of all teams. However, at low levels of return share it is larger than ef-
                                                   
39 To account for repeated measurement the standard errors where determined by assuming clustering on indi-
viduals. Since the choice of effort in GT is made conditional on the choice of task there might be a selection bias 
in effort choices. To check this possibility we estimated an alternative specification following the Heckman 
procedure Heckman (1979). We found the selection effect to be insignificant. 
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fort in teams that are asymmetric but have higher average productivity. Symmetry seems to 
stimulate higher effort. 
 
Table 3.3: Regression Analysis of Effort Choice in GT 
 
Variable  Coefficient Robust Std. 
Error 
P-Value 
Asymmetric 
Team 
Return Share 0.050 0.008 0.000 
Fixed Wage 0.071 0.028 0.012 
Team Productivity 0.323 0.141 0.023 
Dummy Asym. Team -8.932 3.328 0.007 
Symmetric Team 
Return Share -0.015 0.043 0.478 
Fixed Wage 0.079 0.112 0.729 
Dummy Low Team Produc-
tivity -3.495 1.201 0.004 
Period  -0.266 0.056 0.000 
Constant  9.720 3.220 0.003 
Model Statistics: N = 800 
P-Value: 0.000 
Pseudo R2: 0.0324 
   
Dependent Vari-
able:  Effort in GT 
   
Method:  Tobit Regression    
 
Overall it seems that in high productive and symmetric teams effort is close to the upper 
bound so there is little scope for monetary incentives to further increase cooperation. This 
may explain why the return share has no significant influence in these teams. In symmetric 
and low productive teams effort does not respond positively to return share variations either. 
In such teams average individual productivity is 2.5 while individual marginal cost is 2. Thus, 
the team as a whole can benefit from higher production only at very high return shares 
).( 60>GTs .  
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Figure 3.2: Predicted Value Plot for Regression Model 1 
 
 
Notes: Figure 3.2 displays predicted values of effort in GT for teams according to average team productivity 
dependent on return share. The calculation of the predicted value is done with the results of the regression model 
in Table A.3.2 at Appendix A.3.2. 
 
Contrary to Hypothesis 1.c inequality aversion as measured by the Danneberg et al ex-
periment had no significant influence on effort in GT. We tried several regression specifica-
tions (not reported here) but never found significance for effort in GT. We see two possible 
reasons for this. First, effort in GT is taken conditional on self-selection into GT. It may be 
that only the selection of GT is positively influenced by inequality aversion (which will turn 
out below) but not the effort in GT conditional on that choice. Secondly, the Danneberg et al. 
experiment might be a weak empirical measure of F&S-preferences. There is some indication 
of this possibility due to the large fractions of players for which either the α-measure or the β-
measure is missing (36 of 144 agent = 25%).  
3.7.3  Choice of Task 
According to the game rules the agents may choose one out of three tasks, GT or IT or 
none of these (exit option). The frequencies of choices are shown in Table 3.4.40 Accordingly 
agents of high productivity type choose GT more frequently than low productivity types. 
 
 
                                                   
40 These are frequencies of initial task choices. Final choices differed somewhat since agents in GT had to be 
matched in teams of 4 participants. Specifically, the number of final choices of GT was 800. 
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Table 3.4: Frequency of Task Choices 
 
Agent’s Choice Group 
Task 
Individual Task Exit Option Total 
Low Productive Agents 441 205 74 720 
High Productive Agents 487 165 68 720 
Total 928 370 142 1440 
 
Table 3.5: Regression Results of Regression on Task Choices 
 
Choice of Tasks, multinomial logistic regression 
GT versus IT 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P-Value 
Share in GT 0.036 0.004 0.000 
Fix in GT 0.133 0.016 0.000 
Share in IT -0.032 0.005 0.000 
Fix in IT -0.177 0.019 0.000 
HT 0.476 0.166 0.004 
Alpha-high 0.499 0.191 0.009 
Alpha-missing 0.268 0.234 0.252 
Beta-high 0.284 0.175 0.104 
Beta-missing -0.359 0.285 0.207 
Period 0.237 0.096 0.014 
Period2 -0.016 0.008 0.052 
Constant -0.506 0.550 0.358 
Exit Option versus IT 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P-Value 
Share in GT -0.002 0.006 0.695 
Fix in GT -0.094 0.021 0.000 
Share in IT -0.021 0.008 0.008 
Fix in IT -0.260 0.031 0.000 
HT 0.404 0.334 0.226 
Alpha-high 0.801 0.403 0.047 
Alpha-missing -0.097 0.625 0.877 
Beta-high 0.335 0.336 0.318 
Beta-missing -1.377 0.586 0.019 
Period 0.382 0.232 0.101 
Period2 -0.019 0.017 0.283 
Constant -2.959 1.023 0.004 
Model Statistics: N = 1440 
P-Value: 0.000 
Pseudo R2: 0.2462 
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To investigate the influence of contract design and productivity on task choice we ran a 
multinomial logit regression reported in Table 3.5. The upper panel of Table 3.5 shows esti-
mation results for the choice of GT versus the reference category IT. The lower panel shows 
estimation results for the choice of the exit option versus IT. We are mainly interested in the 
choice of GT versus IT therefore we focus on the upper panel. With respect to the influence of 
return shares and fixed wages we find that each of the four estimated coefficients shows the 
predicted sign and is highly statistically significant.41 
Result 2.a: In line with Hypothesis 2.a the probability of choosing GT increases in the 
 payment offered by the GT-contract ( GTGT fs , ) and decreases in the payment offered by 
 the IT-contract ( ITIT fs , ). 
Result 2.b: High productive types choose GT more likely than low productive types. 
The latter is indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of dummy high produc-
tivity. Table 3.5 furthermore reports positive influences of the F&S-preference parameters α 
and β. A joint test for α = β = 0 shows that the coefficients are jointly statistically significant 
(p = 0.016). We collect this finding as 
Result 2.c: GT is chosen more likely by individuals that are more inequality averse. 
Finally we find that the probability of choosing GT increases over time and does so at a 
decreasing rate (see variables period and period2). 
A subtle question with respect to the influence of productivity is whether productivity 
simply shifts the probability of choosing GT upward or whether high types respond in a dif-
ferent manner on return share or fixed wage than low types. Table A.3.3 in Appendix A.3.2 
reports a refined regression model that allows for interaction effects of the dummy high pro-
ductivity and the four payment variables. While three of the four interaction terms are signifi-
cant the main effect of dummy high productivity becomes insignificant. We consider this re-
sult as non-conclusive. 
As a final step in the empirical analysis we want to assess Hypothesis 3. Table 3.6 
shows predicted values (according to the regression model of Table 3.5) for the fraction of 
low types and high types under observable productivity for two different levels of GTs . All 
variables of the regression model except GTs  and dummy high production were set to mean 
values. For comparison Table 3.6 also shows the respective predictions under non-observable 
                                                   
41 Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on individuals. 
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productivity as reported in Königstein and Ruchala (2007). In line with Hypothesis 3 there is 
stronger separation of types when types are observable; the fraction of low productivity types 
entering GT is smaller than with non-observable productivity. But the separation is far from 
being efficient. Efficiency calls for a percentage of high types in GT of 100%. The self-
selection of participants into tasks has led to an allocation of types that is only somewhat 
more efficient than a random allocation of types which would lead to an expected fraction of 
50%. 
 
Table 3.6: Separation of Productivity Types 
 
  Observable  
Productivity 
 Non-observable  
Productivity 
(Königstein/Ruchala) 
  5.0=GTs  8.0=GTs   5.0=GTs  8.0=GTs  
Low Productive Agents  46.1% 48.3%  48.4% 49.3% 
High Productive Agents  53.9% 51.7%  51.6% 50.7% 
 
3.8  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In our experiment we find that effort in GT increases in the return share offered by the 
principal (result 1.a). The terms of the linear GT-contract also influence the choice of task 
(result 2.a.). Thus, monetary incentives have strategic value for self-selection into teams and 
for the degree of team cooperation even if the group task has the structure of a public good 
game. This is counter to the standard neoclassical prediction but it can be rationalized assum-
ing F&S-preferences. 
Team cooperation increases in the team’s average productivity (result 1.b). The partici-
pants anticipate this in their task choice which leads high productivity types to choose GT 
more likely than low productivity types (result 2.b). But the separation of types is far from 
complete: Theoretically, the efficient allocation of types requires all high types to choose GT 
and all low types to choose IT. But in fact, for 50.=GTs  the empirically predicted proportion 
of high types is just 53.9%. Thus, self-selection leads to a very inefficient allocation of types 
to tasks. This result is moderated by observability (result 3). If the team members are in-
formed about types prior to effort choices, the separation of types is stronger than under unob-
servable types as reported by Königstein and Ruchala (2007). 
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However, there is a large gap for possible efficiency gains and one might speculate why 
the allocation of types is so inefficient. Again this question should be discussed within a 
framework of social preferences. The regression model for the choice of task showed that the 
F&S-preference parameters have positive and significant influence on the probability of 
choosing GT (result 2.c). This suggests that there are low productive but inequality averse 
agents who enter teams in order to prevent inequality. In addition there might be a fraction of 
egoistic types that enter teams in order to shirk. But the fraction of egoists must be small be-
cause otherwise cooperation in teams would cease rather fast. 
Counter to what should be expected the F&S-preference parameter did not prove sig-
nificant within the GT-effort-regression. Thus, it may be that only the choice of task is corre-
lated with inequality aversion but not the effort choice which is conditional the task choice. 
Another possibility we mentioned is that the empirical measure of F&S-preference parameters 
is weak and should be improved. 
We found some indication that at low levels of incentives symmetric teams of low types 
show higher levels of cooperation than asymmetric teams of higher average productivity. It 
seems that symmetry helps to establish cooperation. But since only a small fraction of our 
observations are on symmetric groups, this effect should be seen as preliminary. 
In concluding we emphasize that the compound model of F&S-preferences and rational-
ity was successful in producing theoretical predictions that are well supported by the data. Of 
course, other models of social preferences might have been used instead. But to discriminate 
between such models was not our issue here. Rather we studied the influence of team incen-
tives and productivity within a social preference framework to allow for predictions that are 
not to be rejected right away, which is the case if one follows the standard assumption of ego-
istic preferences. 
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4 The Method of Role Uncertainty – A Cheap Way of Data 
Collection and its Impact on Other Regarding Preferences 
4.1  Motivation 
4.1.1  Strategy Method and its Possible Behavioral Influences 
During the last few years the issue of other regarding preferences has received growing 
attention as an important determinant of individual behavior. At the same time there is an on-
going discussion in the field of experimental economics about at least two different methods 
to elicit these preferences. One increasingly prominent way to collect data on other regarding 
preferences is to leave the subjects in the dark about their actual role and therewith also about 
their payoff-relevant actions. However, there is also some evidence that the elicitation method 
itself has an effect on subjects’ decisions. This study investigates whether eliciting other re-
garding preferences under role uncertainty induces different results than the more conserva-
tive way in which subjects know their role before they take their decision. This could present 
a serious problem a fortiori if the results gained by one of the two methods are compared with 
results generated with the other one. Moreover, there might be a systematic bias in the ob-
served preferences if subjects’ decisions are affected by role uncertainty.  
Whenever subjects participate in a sequential game only one response can be generated 
by the direct response method. Consequently, Selten (1967) introduced an alternative method 
which asks for more than only one response. He asked the subjects to state their actions for all 
possible decision nodes and in doing so to give responses to all possible actions of the oppo-
nent. Subjects only learnt the actual decision of the opponent after giving responses to all pos-
sible actions. This method is known as the strategy method. The main advantage of the strate-
gy method is that one may elicit the behavior for the complete strategy space and generate 
more observations. 
The downside of the strategy method is that it may induce different experimental results 
than the direct response method does. If the responder gives his/her response to an actual cho-
sen action, the direct response method may cause stronger emotions than the strategy method. 
This seems to hold especially if the proposer chooses an action which is unexpected for the 
responder because the responder may pay less attention to unexpected actions since they seem 
to be less relevant. A growing number of experimental studies have investigated behavior 
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differences triggered by the strategy method. A survey of this literature is given by Brandts 
and Charness (2011 henceforth B&C). The survey analyses 29 studies. B&C identify four 
studies that report clear behavior differences between collecting data with the direct response 
and strategy method.42 At the same time they found nine studies with mixed evidence. Studies 
with mixed evidences provide only behavior differences that could not refer clearly to the 
different way of collecting data. Moreover, 16 studies have not found behavior differences. 
However, there seem to be systematical differences between the direct response and strategy 
method – i.e., within specific types of experimental designs there are more often differences 
between the methods.  
B&C investigate which types of games lead more often to behavioral differences. One 
type of experiments that induce significant differences are experiments with emotions.43 
However, B&C found in general that studies involving emotions more often report behavioral 
differences between the direct response and strategy method. Such as – a subcategory of ex-
periments involving emotions – in experiments with the opportunity of punishment subjects 
more often punish more often and heavilier under the direct response method.  
The second types of experiments which are sensitive to the strategy method are experi-
ments with only two strategies for the participants. B&C classified the experiments into 
groups with two and more than two available strategies for the subjects. Experiments with 
only two strategies differences between the direct response and the strategy method are more 
often documented than experiments with more than two strategies. 
4.1.2  Role Uncertainty and its Possible Behavioral Influences 
This study investigates the method of role uncertainty which is strongly related to the 
strategy method but which has been less investigated. Eliciting decisions under role uncertain-
ty means that subjects learn their role only after they have already made their decisions. For 
example in the dictator game all subjects make their decisions in the role of the dictator. After 
making their decisions subjects learn which one of them is actually in the role of the dictator 
and the recipient.. It is easy to see that the method of role uncertainty has a similar advantage 
to the strategy method. We may elicit more observations than by the direct response method. 
Thus, the cost of an experiment can be reduced.  
                                                   
42 Brandts and Charness (2003), Brosig et al. (2003), Murphy et al. (2007) and Casari and Cason (2009) have 
found differences. 
43 Studies on other regarding preferences belongs to the group of experiments involving emotions. B&C classify 
in general experiments on industrial organization like pricing etc. as studies not involving emotions. 
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The method is applied in some prominent publications like Charness and Rabin (2002 
henceforth C&R) or Engelmann and Strobel (2004 henceforth E&S).44  
However, to the best of my knowledge there is only one study which investigates the in-
fluence of role uncertainty on subjects’ behavior. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011 henceforth I&R) 
investigate role uncertainty in three-person dictator games. In these games the dictator may 
choose between three options. He may choose a selfish action, a surplus creating or a surplus 
destroying action. The selfish action ensures him/her a marginally higher payoff than the oth-
er actions. Thus, for a selfish dictator to choose the selfish option is a dominant strategy. Sub-
jects who prefer efficiency – i.e, subjects who prefer to maximize the overall outcome – 
would choose the surplus creating action.45 Inequality averse dictators should prefer the sur-
plus destroying action in order to reduce inequality. The result of the study is well summa-
rized in the survey of B&C (p. 394): “They (I&R) find clear evidence that selfish behavior is 
more common when one knows one will be the dictator, while social-welfare-maximizing 
behavior is more common when one does not know one will be the dictator.”46 
I&R document that (p. 172) „there is something inherent to the role uncertainty proce-
dure that makes them choose differently than under role uncertainty.” According to I&R peo-
ple put more value on other regarding preferences under role uncertainty while people behave 
more selfishly under role certainty. Thus, the degree of other regarding preferences seems to 
be less pronounced under role uncertainty. 
However, the question remains what happens if there is no selfish option. Assume that 
subjects also behave differently under role uncertainty without the selfish option. From this 
we can conclude that other regarding preferences are not only less pronounced but biased by 
the method of role uncertainty. This question is not only of relevance for future studies which 
may apply the method of role uncertainty but also for the debate which theory of other regard-
ing preferences best describes these preferences.  
I&R choose experimental games which are almost a replication of the study of E&S 
compared the theories of other regarding preferences of Fehr and Schmidt (1999 henceforth 
                                                   
44 C&R introduce in this study the quasi-maximin preferences while E&S compare in this publication the per-
formance of quasi-maximin preferences with theories of inequality aversion. 
45 Efficiency is a synonymous in this study for the overall payoff maximization.  
46 B&C discuss role uncertainty separately as a related method to the strategy method.  
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F&S), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000 henceforth B&O) with the quasi-maximin preferences of 
C&R.47  
The main difference between these theories of other regarding preferences is also highly 
relevant for this study. Assume the two-player case that the payoff of the player i is fixed and 
the opponent player j is better off. The theories of F&S and B&O predict: the higher the op-
ponent’s outcome the higher the unfavorable inequality and the lower the utility of an inequal-
ity averse subject.48 In contrast C&R’s quasi-maximin preferences predict: the higher the op-
ponent’s outcome the higher the overall outcome and the higher the utility of a subject with 
quasi-maximin preferences.  
The difference between these approaches can be illustrated in a simple dictator game: 
suppose that the dictator is subject A while his opponent is subject B. The dictator may 
choose between allocation 1 and allocation 2. The payoffs of allocation 1 are represented by 
11 BA ππ ,  while the payoffs of allocation 2 are represented by 22, BA ππ . Furthermore, suppose 
that 2112 AABB ππππ ==> . Thus, allocation 1 induces an unfavorable inequality for the dicta-
tor while allocation 2 induces an equal outcome but a lower overall outcome. However, the 
dictator’s payoff is equal for both allocations. Thus, an inequality averse dictator would prefer 
allocation 2 while a dictator with quasi-maximin preferences would prefer allocation 1. 
While I&R found evidence that other regarding preferences are less pronounced under 
role uncertainty this study makes a further step. I investigate whether the characteristic of oth-
er regarding preferences will is impaired by the method of role uncertainty. This question is 
addressed by two-person dictator games.  
4.2  Experimental Design and Predictions 
 I conduct a two-person dictator game which allows the dictator to choose an action ei-
ther to eliminate unfavorable inequality or to maximize the overall outcome associated with 
                                                   
47 The study of E&S met with divided response. See for that issue comments and replies by Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2006), Fehr and Naef (2006) and Engelmann and Strobel (2006). 
48 The main difference between the models of F&S and B&O is as follows: according to B&O the player i's 
utility is decreasing with the opponents' payoffs if i receives less or more than the aggregated payoff of all play-
ers. In contrast, according to F&S each single inequality between the players influences the utility of player i 
negatively. For an illustration assume a three-player-case. Furthermore, suppose that player i receives the payoff 
10 while his/her opponents receive 9 and 11. According to B&O these inequalities do not influence i's utility 
because i receives the average payoff. But according to F&S each of these inequalities reduce i's utility. Howev-
er, for the two-player-case this difference between the models is not relevant since any inequality in a two-
player-case reduces i's utility in both models. 
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unfavorable inequality. The payoff of the dictator is not influenced by his/her action. Howev-
er, his/her action influences the opponent’s payoff. The dictator is subject A and decides elev-
en times between two pairs of payoffs. His/her opponent subject B has no decisions to make. 
The pairs of payoffs are illustrated in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Subjects’ payoffs for each decision 
 
 
Subject A decides in each row between the payoffs in column 1 and 2. In row one the 
payoffs are equal in both columns. In rows 2-11 the payoffs in column 1 are decreasing from 
nine to zero and ensure an equal outcome for both subjects. In column 2 the payoffs for sub-
ject A are the same as in column 1 but the payoffs for subject B are always equal to ten. Thus, 
choosing column 2 induces higher overall payoffs but generates an inequality between the 
subjects. In contrast, choosing column 1 leads to equal payoffs for the subjects but generates 
reduced overall payoffs. Disregarding the first row an inequality averse subject A would 
choose column 1 in any row. An efficiency oriented subject A – i.e., a subject A with quasi-
# Column 1 Column 2 
1 Subject A: 10; Subject B: 10 Subject A: 10; Subject B: 10 
2 Subject A: 9;   Subject B: 9 Subject A: 9;   Subject B: 10 
3 Subject A: 8;   Subject B: 8 Subject A: 8;   Subject B: 10 
4 Subject A: 7;   Subject B: 7 Subject A: 7;   Subject B: 10 
5 Subject A: 6;   Subject B: 6 Subject A: 6;   Subject B: 10 
6 Subject A: 5;   Subject B: 5 Subject A: 5;   Subject B: 10 
7 Subject A: 4;   Subject B: 4 Subject A: 4;   Subject B: 10 
8 Subject A: 3;   Subject B: 3 Subject A: 3;   Subject B: 10 
9 Subject A: 2;   Subject B: 2 Subject A: 2;   Subject B: 10 
10 Subject A: 1;   Subject B: 1 Subject A: 1;   Subject B: 10 
11 Subject A: 0;   Subject B: 0 Subject A: 0;   Subject B: 10 
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maximin preferences – would choose column 2 in any row since the overall payoff is maxim-
ized by column 2.49 
Before decision making the subjects saw all the dictator games – i.e., they saw Table 
4.1. – and did not get the eleven rows separately presented on the screen. Furthermore, to 
avoid irrational choices subjects were allowed to switch between the columns once. Row one 
was introduced to grant the option to switch also for subjects who prefer to choose the same 
column in rows 2-11. 
It is easy to see that efficiency losses increase with the row number when choosing col-
umn 1 while unfavorable inequality increase with the row number when choosing column 2. 
It is conceivable that for some of the subjects efficiency is more (less) imported than the elim-
ination of inequality when the degree of efficiency losses (gains) increases. Thus, switching 
between the columns may be evidence that the preferences of the subjects are better described 
by a hybrid model of inequality aversion and quasi-maximin preferences.50 However, switch-
ing twice or even more often between the columns cannot rationalized. Thus, it was not al-
lowed to avoid irrationality during the experiment 
One part of the subjects played the dictator games under role certainty (henceforth RC) 
while the other part played them under role uncertainty (henceforth RU). Under RC subjects 
learned their role before seeing Table 4.1 and reading the instructions. Under RU all subjects 
made decisions in the role of subject A. However, they knew that they would learn their type 
only after all decision making. This way used RU was the same one adopted by I&R, E&S 
and C&R, too.  
Since theoretically the method of RU must not have any influence on subject`s behavior 
the following hypotheses can be formulated:  
Hypothesis 1: the amount of observations of subjects choosing column 1 is identical 
 under RU and RC. 
Hypothesis 2: switching behavior between the columns is identical under RC and RU. 
                                                   
49 Proofs are shown in Appendix A.4.1. 
50 Erlei (2008) introduced a hybrid model of inequality aversion and quasi-maximin preferences.  
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4.3  Experimental Procedures 
 In total 108 students from various disciplines participated in the experiment. Students 
who had been involved in similar experiments were not allowed to participate. Subjects were 
randomly invited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and matched into one of the treatments. Each 
student participated only one time. Written instructions were handed out to all subjects 
and read out by the author. Subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned to the 
role of subject A or B. Under RU all subjects made their decisions in the role of sub-
ject A. Under RC subjects B had to estimate the opponent’s decision while subject A 
made their decision. However, all subjects knew that the payoffs will be determined 
only by the decision of subject A. After decision making a short written survey was 
carried out. All subjects were seated in cubicles. The experiment was conducted in the 
"Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung (eLab)" at the University of Erfurt. 
The experimental software was written with z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). During the experiment 
payoffs were given in points. The amount of earned points was converted into euro at an ex-
change rate of 1 euro = 2 points. After the experiment one of the eleven rows was picked. The 
points from the chosen column of the picked row were paid out. Subjects were paid after the 
end of the experiment immediately. Each session took about 30 minutes and subjects earned 
about 7 euros on average. Decisions and pay-out were made anonymously. 
4.4  Results 
At first I compare the ratio of equal or efficient distribution decisions in the different 
role conditions RU and RC.51 As can be seen in Table 4.2 the relative frequency of contribu-
tion decisions changes completely under RU and RC. While only one third of the dictators 
choose the equal distribution (column 1) under RU, almost 60% do so under RC. Consequent-
ly two third of the dictators choose the efficient distribution which lead to an unfavorable ine-
quality (column 2) under RU and about 40% do so under RC. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
51 The chosen columns of the first row are not part of the analyses since payoffs are identical in both columns.  
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Table 4.2: Relative frequency of distribution decisions 
 
 Equity Efficiency 
Role uncertainty (RU) 32.22 % 67.78 % 
Role certainty (RC) 59.44 % 40.56 %  
 
The same holds true if we look at the single decisions for the 10 different pairs of distri-
butions. Figure 4.1 illustrates the remarkable shift from the efficient to equal choices if the 
subjects do not know their role during the decision task. The probability that the relative share 
of choosing column 1 is the same under RU and RC and thereby the observed distribution of 
choices (or an even more extreme one) occurs by chance is smaller than 0.01 according to 
Fishers' exact test. Thus, we can reject the first hypothesis that the amount of observations of 
choosing column 1 is identical under RU and RC – i. e., that the role information conditions 
do not influence the subjects’ distribution preferences. 
 
Figure 4.1: Choices in single distribution decisions 
 
 
In order to avoid any undue speculation about subjects’ motives we also have to consid-
er those decisions that are inconsistent over the different distributions – i.e., those subjects 
who switched between the two columns more than once. In the RC treatment 6 out of 36 sub-
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jects decided inconsistently and switched from one column to the other between the second 
and the last row. Although the number of inconsistently deciding subjects is higher (10 out of 
36) in the RU treatment there is no significant difference in the absolute values according to 
Fishers' exact test (p = 0.168).  
However, to test the second hypothesis a closer look to the switching behavior in both 
data collecting methods is necessary. First of all one could mention that most switching deci-
sions (81.25%) happened in the lower part of the payoff table when the difference between 
the two alternatives is more pronounced. Surprisingly the switching direction differs between 
the RC and the RU treatment. While 5 out of 6 subjects switched from efficient to equal dis-
tribution in RC, only 2 out of 10 moved in this direction in the RU treatment. Although the 
number of cases is quite small a Fishers' exact test states a probability of p = 0.035 that this 
distribution occurs by chance. Thus, the second hypothesis, although it cannot be rejected 
with regard to the absolute values of inconsistent decision behavior, has to be rejected if we 
look at the direction of subjects switching decisions.  
Table 4.3: Relative frequency of distribution decisions (without inconsistent decisions) 
 Equity Efficiency 
Role uncertainty (RU) 23.08 % 76.92 % 
Role certainty (RC) 60.00 % 40.00 %  
 
Table 4.3 clearly shows that the frequency of efficient distribution decisions is much 
higher under role uncertainty than under full role information conditions even if we skip those 
subjects with inconsistent decision behavior. Accordingly the number of subjects who prefer 
equal distributions is more than two times higher in RC than in RU. The probability that the 
relative share of choosing column 1 is the same under RU and RC and thereby the observed 
distribution of choices (or an even more extreme one) occurs by chance is smaller than 0.01 
according to a Fishers' exact test.  
4.5  Conclusions 
The results show highly significant difference behavioral differences under RC and RU. 
Thus, the study joins the criticism of I&R on the method of role uncertainty.  
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Under RC the dictator knows for sure that he is acting in the role of the dictator. In con-
trast to RU where the dictator is enforced to put himself/herself in the position of the recipient 
because he/she knows that he/she could be appointed as the recipient. This is shown by the 
results. The dictators under RU are more willing to choose allocations that do not harm the 
recipient. Under RU only about 1/3 of the observations are in line with inequality aversion 
while about 2/3 are in line with quasi-maximin preferences. Thus the majority does not harm 
the recipient under RU. However, under RC about 60% of the observations are in line with 
inequality aversion while only 40% of the observations are in line with quasi-maximin prefer-
ences. Thus the majority does harm the recipient under RC.  
Even after excluding the switchers there is a highly significant behavioral difference 
under RU and RC. However, I have not found significant difference in the absolute number of 
switching between the columns under RU and RC. Also the number of switchers is relatively 
low. Nevertheless, switching could be evidence that a hybrid model of inequality aversion and 
quasi-maximin preferences may better describe the preferences other regarding preferences.  
The method of RU is an unnatural setting to model one-shot interactions since in reality 
these roles are not determined by accident and after making decisions. Thus, eliciting other 
regarding preferences with RU will strongly bias the true preferences so that using this meth-
od in future experimental studies is highly unadvisable. 
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Appendix A.1 
A.1.1  Proof of Proposition 
Proposition 1: If the trustee (second mover in the trust game) is sufficiently inequality 
averse 4/1≥jβ  there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) with maximal invest-
ment and maximal backtransfer and with player P choosing sequence P-First(voluntary 
leadership).  
Proof:  
Suppose that players’ other regarding preferences are described by the following utility 
function (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999): 
 { } { }0
1
1
0
1
1 ,max,max ij
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jji
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jjj nn
U ππβππαπ −
−
−−
−
−= ∑∑
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with restrictions 10 <≤ kβ  and kk βα ≥ . Furthermore, we assume that all parameters 
are common knowledge. 
It is easy to see that for fixed jπ  trustee’s (player j the second mover) utility is decreas-
ing with iπ  (player i the first mover) if ij ππ < . Thus, backtransfer will never exceed invest-
ment and the trustee’s utility function can be reduced to: )( ijjjjU ππβπ −−= . 
Thus the trustee’s utility is given by: 
)]()[( jijijjij yxyxyxU 310310310 +−−−+−−+= β  with the restriction ji yx ≥ .
52 
Due to the linearity of the utility function the trustee (player j) maximizes his/her utility 
by a corner solution. Thus, he/she will either reciprocate positive investment by ij xy =  or 
will not reciprocate at all – i.e., 0=jy . 
For reciprocating positive investment the trustee’s utility is given by: 
jij yxU −+= 310  which can be reduced to ij xU 210 += . 
                                                   
52 ix  represents the first mover’s investment while jy  represents second mover’s backtransfer. 
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For not reciprocating at all the trustee’s utility is given by:
 )]()[( iijij xxxU −−+−+= 10310310 β  which can be reduced to )( jij xU β4310 −+= . 
Since for any positive backtransfer ij xy =  holds we may substitute jy  by ix . Thus, the 
trustee will reciprocate positive investment if: 
ij xU 210+= ≥ )( jix β4310 −+  which is equivalent to 41/≥jβ . 
It is easy to see that to reciprocate (not to reciprocate at all) – i.e., to choose ij xy =  (to 
choose 0=jy ) – is the dominant strategy for )/( / 4141 <> jj ββ  while the trustee is indiffer-
ent if  / 41=jβ .  
Since backtransfer never exceeds investment the first mover’s utility can be reduced to: 
 )( ijiiiU ππαπ −−= . 
Thus, the first mover’s utility is given by:      
 )]()[( jijiijii yxyxyxU 310310310 +−−−+−+−= α  with the restriction ji yx ≥ . 
If the trustee reciprocates – i.e., 41/≥jβ so that ij xy =  – the first mover’s utility is 
given by: 
jii yxU 310 +−=  which can be reduced to ii xU 210 += . 
It is easy to see that the first mover’s utility is increasing with xi so that choosing maxi-
mal investment – i.e., 10=ix – is the dominant strategy.  
Since iij xUU 210 +==  the sequence of the game does not matter and choosing P-First 
(voluntary leadership) with 10== ij xy  is a SPE if 41/≥jβ .  
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A.1.2  Variable List of Chapter 1 
 
Table A.1.1 Variable List of Chapter 1 
 
Variable Scale Description 
 
Investment 
 
0, 1,2, …, 10 
 
amount invested by the first mover 
Backtransfer 0, 1,2, …, 10 amount sent back by the second mover 
Average belief  (0,10) average belief of firstmover about amount sent 
back 
A-First endogenous 0-1 coded P decides that A has to move first 
P-First endogenous 0-1 coded P decides to move first 
P-First exogenous 0-1 coded P has to move first exogenously (control 
treatment) 
Alpha 0-1 coded high unfavored inequality aversion 
Alpha missing 0-1 coded unfavored inequality aversion is missing value 
Beta 0-1 coded high favored inequality aversion 
Beta missing 0-1 coded favored inequality aversion is missing value 
Risk aversion 0-1 coded 
Risk aversion according to Holt and Laury 
(2002) 
Risk loving 0-1 coded 
Risk missing 0-1 coded 
Male 0-1 coded person is male 
WV survey trust 0-1 coded person trusts the most people 
Self control (1,2, …,10) 
16 PA personality factors according to 
Brandstätter (1988) 
Emotional Stability (1,2, …,10) 
Independence (1,2, …,10) 
Tough-mindness (1,2, …,10) 
Extraversion (1,2, …,10) 
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A.1.3  Instructions 
 
Instructions for the Experiment of Chapter 1 (translated from German) 
General Instructions 
 
You are participating in various decision experiments. At the end you will be paid according 
to your performance. Thus it is important, that you fully understand the following instruc-
tions. In the following you read the instruction to experiment 1. The instructions for the other 
experiments take place on the computer screen. 
Depending on your decisions you can earn money within the experiments. Earnings will be 
added to your account while loses will be subtracted. In the end of the experiment your earn-
ings will be paid in cash. Earnings are denoted by points. The conversion into Euro will be 
announced in each experiment. 
 
Please note that during the experiment communication is not allowed. If you have any ques-
tion, please raise your hand out of the cubicle. All decisions are made anonymously. No other 
participant will experience your name and your monetary payoff. 
 
Best of luck! 
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Exogenous Treatment 
Experiment 1 
 
The participants will be divided into groups with two persons each group. They are called 
player A and B. Players are randomly assigned to their groups and types and your type is dis-
played on your screen. Points are converted into euros according to the following rule: 
10 points = 3 euro 
 
1. Each participant receives an endowment.  
 Participant A receives 10 points 
Participant B receives 10 points 
 
2.  Participant B transfers an amount x (0≤ x ≤ 10) to participant A. 
 
3. Participant A gains 3x i. e. participant A receives three times the amount trans-
ferred by B. 
 
4. Participant A transfers an amount y (0≤ y ≤ 10) to participant B. 
 
5. Participant B gains 3y i. e. participant B receives three times the transferred 
amount. 
 
6 The experiment is done.  
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Endogenous Treatment 
Experiment 1 
 
The participants will be divided into groups with two persons each group. They are called 
player A and B. Players are randomly assigned to their groups and types and your type is dis-
played on your screen. Points are converted into Euros according to the following rule: 
10 points = 3 euro 
 
1. Each participant receives an endowment.  
- Participant A receives 10 points 
- Participant B receives 10 points 
 
2. Participant B decides about the sequence to choices. There are two feasible se-
quences. B-A or A-B. If B-A is chosen the experiment continues as described 
in 3.a to 7.a. If A-B is chosen the experiment continues as described in 3.b to 
7.b. 
 
Sequence B-A 
 
3a.  Participant B transfers an amount x (0≤ x ≤ 10) to participant A. 
 
4a. Participant A gains 3x i. e. participant A receives three times the amount trans-
ferred by B. 
 
5a. Participant A transfers an amount y (0≤ y ≤ 10) to participant B. 
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6a. Participant B gains 3y i. e. participant B receives three times the transferred 
amount. 
 
7a. The experiment is done. 
 
Sequence A-B 
 
3a.  Participant A transfers an amount x (0≤ x ≤ 10) to participant B. 
 
4a. Participant B gains 3x i. e. participant B receives three times the amount trans-
ferred by participant A 
 
5a. Participant B transfers an amount y (0≤ y ≤ 10) to participant A. 
 
6a. Participant A gains 3y i. e. participant A receives three times the amount trans-
ferred by participant B. 
 
7a.     The experiment is done. 
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Instructions for the additional Experiments (translated from German) 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Figure A.1.1: Z-tree screenshot of Elicitation of unfavored inequality aversion 
 
 
Notes: Players have to decide upon one of each column in every row. The procedure is as 
proposed by Danneberg et al. 2007. 
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Experiment 3 
 
Figure A.1.2: Z-tree screenshot of Elicitation of favored inequality aversion 
 
 
Notes: Players have to decide upon one of each column in every row. The procedure is as 
proposed by Danneberg et al. 2007. 
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Experiment 4 
 
Figure A.1.3: Z-tree screenshot of Elicitation of Risk Preferences 
 
 
Notes: Players have to decide upon one of two lotteries in every row. The procedure is as pro-
posed by Holt and Laury (2002). 
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Appendix A.2 
A.2.1  Predictions 
A.2.1.1 Predictions with Inequality Aversion 
A.2.1.1.1 Model of Fehr and Schmidt 
Suppose that the utility function of a player i is given by: 
{ } { }∑∑
≠≠
−
−
−−
−
−=
n
ij
jii
n
ij
ijiii nn
U 0
1
1
0
1
1 ,max,max ππβππαπ  
with restrictions 10 <≤ iβ  and ii βα ≥ . The parameter ( iα ) iβ  represents the degree of 
inequality aversion against (un)favorable inequality. The monetary payoffs are represented by 
iπ  and jπ  while n is the number of players.  
A.2.1.1.2 Prediction for the Responder’s Behavior in G100 and G150 
Suppose that the proposer is player j while the responder is player i. Assume that the 
proposer has chosen strategy B. Strategy C induces 150=iπ  and 100=jπ  while strategy D 
induces 150=iπ  and 150=jπ . Since ij ππ >  cannot arise the responder’s utility function 
can be reduced to )( jiiiiU ππβπ −−= . I denote the responder’s utility for choosing strategy 
C by )(CUi  and for choosing strategy D by )(DUi . The responder (weakly) prefers strategy 
D if )()( CUDU ii ≥ . This condition is fulfilled if: )()( 100150150150150150 −−≥−− ii ββ  
which is equivalent to .0≥iβ  
It is easy to see that the responder is indifferent between strategies C and D if 0=iβ . 
For 0>iβ  he prefers strategy D since )()( CUDU ii > . Assume that the players dislike favor-
able and unfavorable inequality – i.e., 0≠≥ kk βα  so that the condition 0>iβ  is always ful-
filled. Thus: 
- strategy D is the dominant strategy for the responder in G100 as well as in G150. 
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A.2.1.1.3 Prediction for the Proposer’s Behavior in G100  
Suppose that the responder is player j and the proposer is player i. Strategy A induces 
100=iπ  and 200=jπ  while strategy B induces 100=iπ  )150( =iπ  and 150=jπ  if the 
responder chooses strategy C (D). Since ij ππ <  cannot arise the responder’s utility function 
can be reduced to )( ijiiiU ππαπ −−= . I denote the proposer’s utility for choosing strategy 
A by )(AUi  and for choosing strategy B by )(BUi . Furthermore, the proposer’s subjective 
probability that the responder chooses strategy C after observing strategy B is p and his sub-
jective probability that the responder chooses strategy D after observing strategy B is )1( p− . 
The proposer will (weakly) prefer strategy B if )()( AUBU ii ≥ . This condition is fulfilled if: 
)()(()( 1002001001001501001501 −−≥−−+− iipp αα  which is equivalent to 
).2/()1( ppi −−≥α   
It is easy to see that the proposer prefers strategy B or he/she is indifferent between 
strategy A and B if )2/()1( ppi −−=α  which only holds if 1=p  and 0=iα  are fulfilled. 
Otherwise see that )2/()1( ppi −−>α  and )()( AUBU ii > . However, strategy C is a (weakly) 
dominated. Thus, 1=p  is an implausible belief and )2/()1( ppi −−=α  cannot be fulfilled. 
Therefore, strategy B becomes strong dominant even for 0=iα . Furthermore, assume that 
0≠≥ kk βα  so that the condition )2/()1( ppi −−>α  is always fulfilled. Thus: 
- strategy B is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G100. 
A.2.1.1.4 Prediction for the Proposer’s Behavior in G150  
Suppose that the responder is player j and the proposer is player i. Strategy A induces 
150=iπ  and 200=jπ  while strategy B induces 100=iπ  )150( =iπ  and 150=jπ  if the 
responder chooses strategy C (D). Since ij ππ <  cannot arise the responder’s utility function 
can be reduced to )( ijiiiU ππαπ −−= . I denote the proposer’s utility for choosing strategy 
A by )(AUi  and for choosing strategy B by )(BUi . Furthermore, the proposer’s subjective 
probability that responder chooses strategy C after observing strategy B is p and his subjective 
probability that the responder chooses strategy D after observing strategy B is )1( p− . Pro-
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poser will (weakly) prefer strategy B if )()( AUBU ii ≥ . This condition is fulfilled if: 
)()(()( 1502001501001501001501 −−≥−−+− iipp αα  which is equivalent to )/( ppi −≥ 1α . 
For the assumption that players dislike favorable and unfavorable inequality – i.e., 
0≠≥ kk βα  – strategy D is strong dominant for the responder. Therefore, any rational pro-
poser has to assume 0=p  and )1/( ppi −>α  is fulfilled. Thus: 
- strategy B is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G150. 
A.2.1.2 Predictions with Quasi-Maximin Preferences 
A.2.1.2.1 Model of Charness and Rabin 
Suppose that a player i’s utility function is given by: 
{ }[ ])...()(,...,,min)(),...,,( NNiNiU πππδπππδλπλπππ +++⋅−+⋅+−≡ 212121 11  
)( λ−1  is the level player i puts on his monetary payoff iπ  while he puts level [ ]10,∈λ  on the 
social good. The social good is a weighted average of the worst off player’s payoff and the 
aggregated payoff of all players. ),( 10∈δ  is the part a player i puts on the worst off player`s 
payoff. In contrast )( δ−1 is the part a player i puts the on total-surplus maximization. For a 
two player case the utility of player i can be simplified to: 

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A.2.1.2.2 Prediction for the Responder’s Behavior in G100 and G150 
Suppose that the proposer is player j and the responder is player i. Assume that the pro-
poser has chosen strategy B. Strategy C induces 150=iπ  and 100=jπ  while strategy D in-
duces 150=iπ  and 150=jπ . Since ij ππ >  cannot arise the responder’s utility function can 
be reduced to jiiU λδππλδ +−= )(1 . I denote responder’s utility for choosing strategy C by 
)(CU i  and for choosing strategy D by )(DUi . The responder (weakly) prefers strategy D if 
)()( CUDU ii ≥ . This condition is fulfilled if: 100λδλδ)150(1150λδλδ)150(1 +−≥+−  which 
is equivalent to 0≥λδ .  
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For 0=λδ  the responder is indifferent between strategy D and C. However, since 
( )10,∈δ  the condition 0=λδ  is only fulfilled for 0=λ . Assume that the players are not 
selfish – i.e., ( ]10,∈λ  – the condition 0>λδ  is always fulfilled. Thus:  
- strategy D is the dominant strategy for the responder in G100 as well as in G150. 
A.2.1.2.3 Prediction for the Proposer’s Behavior in G100 
Suppose that the responder is player j and the proposer is player i. Strategy A induces 
100=iπ  and 200=jπ  while strategy B induces 100=iπ  )150( =iπ  and 150=jπ  if the 
responder chooses strategy C (D). Since ij ππ <  cannot arise the responder’s utility function 
can be reduced to jiiU πδλπ )( −+= 1 . I denote the proposer’s utility for choosing strategy A 
by )(AUi  and choosing strategy B by )(BUi . Furthermore, the proposer’s subjective proba-
bility that the responder chooses strategy C after observing strategy B is p and the subjective 
probability that the responder chooses strategy D after observing strategy B is )( p−1 . The 
proposer will (weakly) prefer strategy B if )()( AUBU ii ≥ . This condition is fulfilled if: 
2001001501001501501 )())(())()(( λδλλδλλδλ −+≥−++−+− pp  which is equivalent to 
)()( δλ −≥− 11 p . 
For the assumption that players are not selfish – i.e., ( ]10,∈λ  – strategy D is strong 
dominant for the responder. Hence, any rational proposer has to assume 0=p . For 0=p  the 
condition )()( δλ −≥− 11 p  reduces to )( δλ −≥ 11 . Since ),( 10∈δ  the condition )( δλ −> 11  
is always fulfilled. Thus: 
- strategy B is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G100. 
A.2.1.2.4 Prediction for the Proposer’s Behavior in G150 
Suppose that the responder is player j and the proposer is player i. Strategy A induces 
100=iπ  and 200=jπ  while strategy B induces 100=iπ  )150( =iπ  and 150=jπ  if the 
responder chooses strategy C (D). Since ij ππ <  cannot arise the responder’s utility function 
can be reduced to jiiU πδλπ )1( −+= . I denote the proposer’s utility for choosing strategy A 
by )(AUi  and choosing strategy B by )(BUi . Furthermore, p is the proposer’s subjective 
probability that the responder chooses strategy C after observing strategy B and )( p−1  is his 
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subjective probability that the responder chooses strategy D after observing strategy B. The 
proposer will (weakly) prefer strategy A if )()( AUBU ii ≤ . This condition is fulfilled if:
200)(150)150)(100()150)(150)(1( λδλλδλλδλ −+<−++−+− pp  which is equivalent to 
.)( p≤− λδ 1  
For p=− λδ )( 1  the proposer is indifferent between strategy A and B. However, since 
)1,0(∈δ  the condition p=− λδ )1(  is only fulfilled for 0=λ  and 0=p . For the assumption 
that the players are not selfish – i.e., ( ]10,∈λ  – the condition p<− λδ )1(  is always fulfilled. 
Thus:  
- strategy A is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G150. 
A.2.1.3 Predictions by a Theory of Reciprocity 
A.2.1.3.1 Model of Falk and Fischbacher 
While outcome based models only deal with a comparison of outcomes in the end nodes 
F&F’s model also deals with expectations about the opponent’s moves, beliefs and intentions. 
Thus, in each node of the game players form their beliefs about the opponent’s behavior. Fur-
thermore, the model records the player’s intention by analyzing the expected payoff differ-
ences and the opponent`s influence on these payoffs. In doing so, the kindness of the oppo-
nent’s expected moves are determined and become part of the utility function.  
The main points of the model are the kindness term which measures experienced kind-
ness and the reciprocation term which represents the response to the experienced kindness. 
Before starting to formalize the model I introduce some notification: the nodes of the game 
are n, Nn∈ . The end node is called f. Player i’s belief about player j’s move is denoted by 
jb  (first order belief). Player i’s belief about what j believes about i’s move is denoted by ic  
(second order belief). 
The kindness term measures player j’s kindness to player i. A positive (negative) sign of 
the kindness term denotes kindness (unkindness) by player j to player i. The kindness term 
will be determined by the opponent’s intention and by the expected monetary outcomes. 
Thus, the kindness term is given in each node n where i has to act for given strategies and 
beliefs by: 
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),,(),,(),,( ijjijjijj cbncbncbn ∆=υϕ . 
The first term (second term) on the equation’s right-side is the intention factor (outcome 
term).  
The outcome term is given by: 
),,(),,(),,( ijjijiijj cbncbncbn ππ −=∆ . 
It is the difference between the expected payoffs from i’s point of view. Thus, 
),,( iji cbnπ  is what i expects to get from j and ),,( ijj cbnπ  is what i believes j expects to 
get.53 
The intention factor measures the intentionality of the opponent’s move. I adopt the no-
tational simplifications of F&F when describing the intention factor. To measure the oppo-
nent’s intention the expected payoffs 0iiji cbn ππ =),,(  and 
0
jijj cbn ππ =),,(  are compared 
with alternatives. The set of alternatives ),( ji bnΠ  are payoff combinations which player j 
may induce through his/her moves. Thus, intention factor is given by:  
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where iε  is an individual parameter with [ ]10,∈iε . Camerer (2003 p.109) summarizes these 
four cases as follows: “Roughly speaking, intention is equal to 1 when player j gives more to i 
than to herself and she could have given i less, or when she gives less to i and could have giv-
en more. Intentions are equal to a value iε  if j gives i more then to herself but could have 
given even more, or if j gives i less but could have given even less.”  
We should note that the kindness is a product of the outcome term and the intention fac-
tor. Thus, player j’s move is kind (unkind) if the kindness term is positive (negative). The 
                                                   
53 F&F even can determine with this concept the kindness of a player j who never makes any move like in a 
dictator game. In such a case the outcome term is determined by i’s second order belief – i.e., what player i does 
believe about what j believes about i’s strategy. See more detailed the predictions of an optimal distribution in 
the dictator game in F&F (p.307-308).  
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higher the intention factor the higher the kindness or unkindness. For 0=iε  the opponent’s 
move is neither kind nor unkind.  
Furthermore, a positive (negative) outcome term is a necessary condition to interpret 
opponent’s move as a kind (unkind) action. This is an important implication since the out-
come term measures expected inequalities. This implies the following: if player j is better off 
than player i, even getting a gift from player j is never interpreted as kind by player i. On the 
contrary if player j is worse off, even taking money away from player i is never interpreted as 
unkind by player i.  
The next term of F&F’s model is the reciprocation term: 
),,(),),,((),,,( ijjijjiji cbncbfncbfn πυπσ −= . 
For a brief description of the reciprocation term I cite F&F (p. 301): “The reciprocation 
term expresses the response to the experienced kindness, i.e., it measures how much i alters 
the payoff of j with his move in node n. Given i’s belief about j ’s expectations about her pay-
off in node n – i.e., given ),,( ijj cbnπ  – i can choose an action in node n. The reciprocal im-
pact of this action is represented as the alteration of j’s payoff from ),,( ijj cbnπ  to 
),),,(( ijj cbfnυπ  (always from i’s perspective). For a given ),,( ijj cbnπ , i can thus either 
choose to reward or to punish j. A rewarding action implies a positive, whereas a punishment 
implies a negative reciprocation term.” 
The utility function of player i is given by: 
∑
→
+=
fn
ijiijjiiiji cbfncbnfcbfU ),,,(),,()(),,( σϕρπ  
The overall utility is the sum of player i’s monetary payoff at the end node f and the reciproci-
ty utility. The latter is the product of the kindness term and the reciprocation term where both 
are summed up over all nodes of the game and weighted by an individual given positive con-
stant parameter, the reciprocity parameter iρ .  
Reciprocity according to F&F works as follows: if the reciprocity utility is positive, the 
overall utility increases and reciprocity will be triggered. The reciprocity utility is positive 
either if the kindness term and the reciprocation term are both positive or if both terms are 
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negative. A positive (negative) sign of the kindness and reciprocation term means positive 
(negative) reciprocity which implies a reward (punishment) for the opponent. 
A.2.1.3.2 Prediction for the Responder’s Behavior in G100 and G150 
Suppose that the players are not selfish – i.e., 0>kρ .
54 Furthermore, suppose that the 
proposer is player j while the responder is player i and the proposer has chosen strategy B. 
From this node the games G100 and G150 are identical. The proposer’s alternative – i.e., 
strategy, A – would imply 200=)( fiπ  and )()( ff ji ππ > in both games (G100 and G150). 
Thus, the responder’s best reply to strategy B is identical for G100 and G150. 
The experienced kindness is given by ),,(),,(),,( ijjijjijj cbncbncbn ∆=υϕ  where 
),,(),,(),,( ijjijiijj cbncbncbn ππ −=∆ . 150=),,( iji cbnπ  since the responder’s payoff is 
equal to 150 for strategy C as well as for strategy D. ),,( ijj cbnπ  depends on ic  – i.e., what 
player i believes about j believes about i’s strategy. Thus, ][ 150100,),,( ∈ijj cbnπ  since 100 
and 150 are the proposer’s feasible payoffs. Hence, the outcome term is 
.),,(),,(),,( 0≥−=∆ ijjijiijj cbncbncbn ππ  Furthermore, the intention factor is 
i ),,( ευ =ijj cbn , with ].,[ 10∈iε
55 Thus, the kindness term is:
0≥∆= ),,(),,(),,( ijjijjijj cbncbncbn υϕ .  
The reciprocation term is given by ),,(),),,((),,,( ijjijjiji cbncbfncbfn πυπσ −= . 
),),,(( ijj cbfnυπ  represents the proposer’s payoff at the end of the game and is equal to 100 
for strategy C and equal to 150 for strategy D. Since ][ 150100,),,( ∈ijj cbnπ  the reciprocation 
term is either 0≤),,,( iji cbfnσ  for strategy C or 0≥),,,( iji cbfnσ  for strategy D.  
The overall utility is given by ∑
→
+=
fn
ijiijjiiiji cbfncbnfcbfU ),,,(),,()(),,( σϕρπ . 
For simplicity I denote the overall utility for strategy C with )(CUi  and for strategy D with 
)(DUi .  
                                                   
54 The analysis of the game under 0=kρ  is identical to the solution of the game by the model of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) for 0== kk βα . 
55 Out of the four possible cases which determine the intention factor’s value the second case arise for the feasi-
ble alternative outcomes.  
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For strategy C holds that 150=)( fiπ , 0≥),,( ijj cbnϕ  and 0≤),,,( iji cbfnσ . Thus, the 
overall utility is 150≤)(CUi . 
For strategy D holds that 150=)( fiπ , 0≥),,( ijj cbnϕ  and 0≥),,,( iji cbfnσ . Thus, the 
overall utility 150≥)(DUi . 
The responder is indifferent between strategy C and D for 150== )()( DUCU ii  other-
wise he prefers strategy D. 150== )()( DUCU ii  is fulfilled if the kindness term is equal to 
zero. This case arise if 150=),,( ijj cbnπ  and / or if 0== iijj cbn ευ ),,( . For these cases the 
kindness term is equal to zero and the overall utility reduces to the monetary payoff which is 
equal to 150. Otherwise )()( DUCU ii <  holds and strategy D is the dominant strategy. Thus: 
- strategy D is either the dominant strategy for the responder or he may be indifferent 
 between strategy C or D in G100 as well as in G150. 
A.2.1.3.3 Prediction for the Proposer’s Behavior in G100 
Suppose that the players are not selfish – i.e., 0>kρ .
56 Furthermore, suppose that the 
proposer is player j and the responder is player i. 
The experienced kindness is given by ),,(),,(),,( ijjijjijj cbncbncbn ∆=υϕ , where 
),,(),,(),,( ijjijiijj cbncbncbn ππ −=∆ . Note that the outcome term depends on the propos-
er’s belief about the responder’s move in the following node of the game and on the propos-
er’s belief about what responder believes about proposer’s move. ][ 150100,),,( ∈iji cbnπ  be-
cause the proposer’s feasible payoffs are 100 and 150. ][ 200150,),,( ∈ijj cbnπ  because the 
responder’s feasible payoffs are 150 and 200. Hence, the outcome term is 
0≤−=∆ ),,(),,(),,( ijjijiijj cbncbncbn ππ . Furthermore, the intention factor is 
1=),,( ijj cbnυ .
57 Thereby, the kindness term is 0≤∆= ),,(),,(),,( ijjijjijj cbncbncbn υϕ . 
More precisely, the kindness term reduces to the outcome term 0≤∆= ),,(),,( ijjijj cbncbnϕ .  
                                                   
56The analysis of the game under 0=kρ  is identical to the solution of the game by the model of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) for 0== kk βα . 
57 Out of the four possible cases which determine intention factor’s value the first or third case may arise for the 
feasible alternative outcomes. 
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The reciprocation term is given by ),,(),),,((),,,( ijjijjiji cbncbfncbfn πυπσ −= . 
),),,(( ijj cbfnυπ  represents the responder’s payoff at the end of the game and is equal to 200 
for strategy A and equal to 150 for strategy B. Thus, the reciprocation term is either 
0≥),,,( iji cbfnσ  for strategy A or 0≤),,,( iji cbfnσ  for strategy B.  
The overall utility is given by ∑
→
+=
fn
ijiijjiiiji cbfncbnfcbfU ),,,(),,()(),,( σϕρπ . For 
simplicity I denote the utility for strategy A by )(AUi  and for strategy B by )(BUi . Note that 
for strategy B the payoff )( fiπ  is equal to 100 (150) if the responder chooses strategy C (D).  
When choosing strategy A holds: 100=)( fiπ , 0≤),,( ijj cbnϕ  and 0≥),,,( iji cbfnσ . 
Thus, the overall utility is 100≤)(AUi . 
When choosing strategy B holds: [ ]150100,)( ∈fiπ , 0≤),,( ijj cbnϕ  and 
0≤),,,( iji cbfnσ . Thus, the overall utility is 100≥)(BUi . 
The proposer is indifferent between strategy A and B if 100== )()( BUAU ii  otherwise 
he prefers strategy B since )()( BUAU ii <  holds. However, 100=)(AUi  might arise only in a 
very strange case. A necessary condition for 100=)(AUi  is a non-negative kindness term – i. 
e., 0=∆= ),,(),,( ijjijj cbncbnϕ . If the proposer believes that the responder could choose 
strategy C –i.e. the responder could punish him for choosing strategy B – the proposer’s utili-
ty would be 100)( <AUi . Thus, a non-negative kindness term only arises if the proposer be-
lieves that the responder will choose strategy D after observing strategy B. However, if the 
responder chooses strategy D after observing strategy B all payoffs are equal to 150 which 
implies a higher overall utility for the proposer than when choosing strategy A. Thus, the pro-
poser has no incentive to choose strategy A if he believes that the responder will choose strat-
egy D after observing strategy B. Hence, it is implausible to assume that a responder can be 
indifferent between strategy A and strategy B although 100== )()( BUAU ii  is mathematical-
ly feasible. Since 100== )()( BUAU ii  is implausible the condition )()( BUAU ii <  is always 
fulfilled. Thus: 
- strategy B is the dominant strategy for the proposer in G100. 
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A.2.1.3.4 Prediction for the Proposer’s Behavior in G150 
Suppose that is the players are not selfish – i.e., 0>kρ .
58 Furthermore, suppose that the 
proposer is player j and the responder is player i. 
The analyses of the kindness term and the reciprocation term are the same as in G100. 
The overall utility is given by ∑
→
+=
fn
ijiijjiiiji cbfncbnfcbfU ),,,(),,()(),,( σϕρπ . For 
simplicity I denote the utility for strategy A by )(AUi  and for strategy B by )(BUi . Note that 
for choosing strategy B the payoff )( fiπ  is equal to 100 (150) if the responder chooses strat-
egy C (D).  
When choosing strategy A holds: 150=)( fiπ , 0),,( ≤ijj cbnϕ  and 0),,,( ≥iji cbfnσ . 
Thus, the overall utility is 150)( ≤AUi . 
When choosing strategy B holds: ][ 150,100)( ∈fiπ , 0),,( ≤ijj cbnϕ  and 
0≤),,,( iji cbfnσ . Thus, the overall utility is 100≥)(BUi . 
Thus, depending on the proposer’s beliefs and on his/her reciprocation parameter iρ  
he/she may prefer strategy A as well as strategy B or he/she might be indifferent. The closer 
iρ , kindness term and reciprocation term to zero the more likely is )()( BUAU ii > .  
In summary: 
- both strategies may be dominant for the proposer in G150. 
A.2.1.4 Predictions for the Responder’s Behavior with     
 Inequality Aversion in Game 1 and Game 2 
A.2.1.4.1 Prediction for the Responder’s Behavior in Game 1 
I use the utility function and notification introduced in A.2.1.1.1. 
                                                   
58The analysis of the game under 0=kρ  is identical to the solution of the game by the model of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) for 0== kk βα . 
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Suppose that the proposer is player j while the responder is player i. Assume that the 
proposer has chosen strategy B. Strategy C induces 125=iπ  and 75=jπ  while strategy D 
induces 125=iπ  and 125=jπ . Since ij ππ >  cannot arise the responder’s utility function 
can be reduced to )( jiiiiU ππβπ −−= . I denote the responder’s utility for choosing strategy 
C by )(CUi  and for choosing strategy D by )(DUi . The responder (weakly) prefers strategy 
D if )()( CUDU ii ≥ . This condition is fulfilled if: )()( 75125125125125125 −−≥−− ii ββ  
which is equivalent to 0≥iβ . 
It is easy to see that the responder is indifferent between strategies C and D if 0=iβ . 
For 0>iβ  he/she prefers strategy D since )()( CUDU ii > . Assume that the players dislike 
favorable and unfavorable inequality – i.e., 0≠≥ kk βα  – so that the condition 0>iβ  is al-
ways fulfilled. Thus: 
- strategy D is a dominant strategy for the responder in Game 1. 
A.2.1.4.2 Prediction for the Responder’s Behavior in Game 2 
I use the utility function and notification introduced in A.2.1.1.1.  
Suppose that the proposer is player j while the responder is player i. Assume that the 
proposer has chosen strategy B. Strategy C induces 400=iπ  and 200=jπ  while strategy D 
induces 400=iπ  and 400=jπ . Since ij ππ >  cannot arise the responder’s utility function 
can be reduced to )( jiiiiU ππβπ −−= . I denote the responder’s utility for choosing strategy 
C by )(CUi  and for choosing strategy D by )(DUi . Responder (weakly) prefers strategy D if 
)()( CUDU ii ≥ . This condition is fulfilled if: )()( 200400400400400400 −−≥−− ii ββ  
which is equivalent to 0≥iβ . 
It is easy to see that the responder is indifferent between strategies C and D if 0=iβ . 
For 0>iβ  he/she prefers strategy D since )()( CUDU ii > . Assume that the players dislike 
favorable and unfavorable inequality – i.e., 0≠≥ kk βα  – so that the condition 0>iβ  is al-
ways fulfilled. Thus: 
- strategy D is a dominant strategy for the responder in Game 2. 
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A.2.1.5 Predictions for the Responder’s Behavior with   
 Quasi-Maximin Preferences in Game 1 and Game 2 
A.2.1.5.1 Prediction for the Responder’s Behavior in Game 1 
I use the utility function and notification introduced in A.2.1.2.1. 
Suppose that the proposer is player j and the responder is player i. Assume that the pro-
poser has chosen strategy B. Strategy C induces 125=iπ  and 75=jπ  while strategy D in-
duces 125=iπ  and 125=jπ . Since ij ππ >  cannot arise the responder’s utility function can 
be reduced to jiiU λδππλδ +−= )(1 . I denote the responder’s utility for choosing strategy C 
by )(CUi  and for choosing strategy D by )(DUi . The responder (weakly) prefers strategy D 
if )()( CUDU ii ≥ . This condition is fulfilled if: 7512511251251 λδλδλδλδ +−≥+− )()(  
which is equivalent to 0≥λδ . 
For 0=λδ  the responder is indifferent between strategies D or C. However, since 
),( 10∈δ  the condition 0=λδ  is only fulfilled for 0=λ . Assumed that players are not self-
ish – i.e., ( ]10,∈λ  – the condition 0>λδ  is always fulfilled. Thus: 
- strategy D is a dominant strategy for the responder in Game 1. 
A.2.1.5.2 Prediction for the Responder’s Behavior in Game 2 
I use the utility function and notification introduced in A.2.1.2.1. 
Suppose that the proposer is player j and responder is player i. Assume that the proposer 
has chosen strategy B. Strategy C induces 400=iπ  and 200=jπ  while strategy D induces 
400=iπ  and 400=jπ . Since ij ππ >  cannot arise the responder’s utility function can be 
reduced to jiiU λδππλδ +−= )(1 . I denote the responder’s utility for choosing strategy C by 
)(CUi  and for choosing strategy D by )(DUi . The responder (weakly) prefers strategy D if 
)()( CUDU ii ≥ . This condition is fulfilled if: 20040014004001 λδλδλδλδ +−≥+− )()(  
which is equivalent to 0≥λδ . 
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For 0=λδ  the responder is indifferent between strategies D or C. However, since 
),( 10∈δ  the condition 0=λδ  is only fulfilled for 0=λ . Assumed that players are not self-
ish – i.e., ( ]10,∈λ  – the condition 0>λδ  is always fulfilled. Thus: 
- strategy D is the dominant strategy for the responder in Game 2. 
A.2.1.6 Predictions for the Responder’s Behavior with     
 the Model of Falk and Fischbacher in Game 1 and Game 2  
A.2.1.6.1 Prediction for the Responder’s Behavior in Game 1 
I use the utility function and notification introduced in A.2.1.3.1. 
Assume that none of the players is selfish – i.e., 0>kρ .
59 Suppose the proposer has 
chosen strategy B. The responder’s payoff is equal to 125 in any case and the proposer’s pay-
off is equal to 125 (75) if the responder chooses strategy D (C).  
The outcome term is 0≥−=∆ ),,(),,(),,( ijjijiijj cbncbncbn ππ  because 
125=),,( iji cbnπ  and ][ 12575,),,( ∈ijj cbnπ . Due to the feasible alternative payoffs for the 
intention factor holds: .  ),,( iijj cbn ευ =
60 Note that   iε  is an individual parameter with 
[ ]10,∈iε . Thereby, the kindness term is 0≥∆= ),,(),,(),,( ijjijjijj cbncbncbn υϕ . 
Next I analyze the reciprocation term ),,(),),,((),,,( ijjijjiji cbncbfncbfn πυπσ −= . 
),),,(( ijj cbfnυπ  represents the proposer’s payoff at the end of the game which is equal to 75 
for choosing strategy C and equal to 125 for choosing strategy D. ][ 125,75),,( ∈ijj cbnπ  be-
cause the reciprocation term is either 0≤),,,( iji cbfnσ  if the responder chooses strategy C or 
0≥),,,( iji cbfnσ  if the responder chooses strategy D.  
Now I turn to the overall utility ∑
→
+=
fn
ijiijjiiiji cbfncbnfcbfU ),,,(),,()(),,( σϕρπ . 
For simplicity I denote the overall utility for choosing strategy C by )(CUi  and for choosing 
strategy D by )(DUi . 
                                                   
59The analysis of the game under 0=kρ  is identical to the solution of the game by the model of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) for 0== kk βα . 
60 Out of the four possible cases that determine the value of the intention factor the second case arise for the 
feasible alternative outcomes.  
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When choosing strategy C holds: 125)( =fiπ , 0),,( ≥ijj cbnϕ  and 0≤),,,( iji cbfnσ . 
Thus, the overall utility is 125)( ≤CUi . 
When choosing strategy D holds: 125)( =fiπ , 0),,( ≥ijj cbnϕ  and 0),,,( ≥iji cbfnσ . 
Thus, the overall utility is 125≥)(DUi . 
The responder is indifferent between strategy C and D if 125== )()( DUCU ii  other-
wise he/she prefers strategy D. 125== )()( DUCU ii  is fulfilled if the kindness term is equal 
to zero. This case arise if 125=),,( ijj cbnπ  and / or 0== iijj cbn ευ ),,( . For these cases the 
kindness term is equal to zero and the overall utility reduces to the monetary payoff which is 
equal to 125. Otherwise )()( DUCU ii <  is fulfilled and strategy D is the dominant strategy.  
A.2.1.6.2 Prediction for the Responder’s Behavior in Game 2 
The proof for Game 2 is identical to the proof of Game 1 shown in A.2.1.6.1. Only the 
payoffs are different.  
Assume that none of the players is selfish – i.e., 0>kρ .
61 Suppose the proposer has 
chosen strategy B. The responder’s payoff is equal to 400 in any case and the proposer’s pay-
off is equal to 400 (200) if the responder chooses strategy D (C).  
The outcome term is 0≥−=∆ ),,(),,(),,( ijjijiijj cbncbncbn ππ  because 
400=),,( iji cbnπ  and ][ 400200,),,( ∈ijj cbnπ . Due to the feasible alternative payoffs for the 
intention factor holds: .  ),,( iijj cbn ευ =
62 Note that   iε  is an individual parameter with 
[ ]10,∈iε . Thereby, the kindness term is 0≥∆= ),,(),,(),,( ijjijjijj cbncbncbn υϕ . 
Next I analyze the reciprocation term ),,(),),,((),,,( ijjijjiji cbncbfncbfn πυπσ −= . 
),),,(( ijj cbfnυπ  represents the proposer’s payoff at the end of the game which is equal to 
200 for choosing strategy C and equal to 400 for choosing strategy D. Since 
                                                   
61The analysis of the game under 0=kρ  is identical to the solution of the game by the model of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) for 0== kk βα . 
62 Out of the four possible cases that determine intention factor`s value the second case arise for the feasible 
alternative outcomes.  
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][ 400200,),,( ∈ijj cbnπ  the reciprocation term is either 0≤),,,( iji cbfnσ  if the responder 
chooses strategy C or 0≥),,,( iji cbfnσ  if the responder chooses strategy D.  
Now I turn to the overall utility ∑
→
+=
fn
ijiijjiiiji cbfncbnfcbfU ),,,(),,()(),,( σϕρπ . 
For simplicity I denote the overall utility for choosing strategy C by )(CUi  and for choosing 
strategy D by )(DUi . 
When choosing strategy C holds: 400=)( fiπ , 0),,( ≥ijj cbnϕ  and 0≤),,,( iji cbfnσ . 
Thus, the overall utility is 400≤)(CUi . 
When choosing strategy D holds: 400=)( fiπ , 0),,( ≥ijj cbnϕ  and 0),,,( ≥iji cbfnσ . 
Thus, the overall utility is 400≥)(DUi . 
The responder is indifferent between strategy C and D for 400== )()( DUCU ii  other-
wise he/she prefers strategy D. 400== )()( DUCU ii  holds if the kindness term is equal to 
zero. This case arise if 400=),,( ijj cbnπ  and/or 0== iijj cbn ευ ),,( . For these cases the 
kindness term is equal to zero and the overall utility reduces to the monetary payoff which is 
equal to 400. Otherwise )()( DUCU ii <  is fulfilled and strategy D is the dominant strategy.  
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A.2.2  Instructions 
 
Instructions for the Experiment of Chapter 2 (translated from German) 
(Instruction of G100. The instructions for G100 and G150 are analogue so that I waive the 
instruction of G150)  
Depending on your decisions you can earn money within the experiments. Earnings will be 
added to your account while loses will be subtracted. In the end of the experiment your earn-
ings will be paid cash. Earnings are denoted by points.  
 
Points are converted into euros according to the following rule: 
 
20 points = 1 euro 
 
Please note that during the experiment communication is not allowed. If you have any ques-
tion, please raise your hand out of the cubicle. All decisions are made anonymously. No other 
participant will experience your name and your monetary payoff. 
 
Schedule of the experiment:  
 
You will be randomly divided into groups with two members. Each group consists of a partic-
ipant A and participant B. Participants` types will not change during the experiment. Your 
type is show on the instruction.  
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You are participant A 
You can choose between the actions A and B. If you choose action A you receive 100 points 
and participant B receives 200. If you choose action B, participant B’s choice determines final 
outcome. If you choose action B and participant B choose action C, you receive 100 points 
and participant B receives 150 points. If you choose action B and participant B choose action 
D, you receive 100 points and participant B receives 150 points. Participant B makes his 
choice without knowing your decision. However, participant B knows that his/her decision is 
only of relevance if you choose action B. Thus, participant B makes his/her decision on the 
assumption that you have chosen action B. The sequence of the experiment is shawn in the 
following figure: 
 
You can choose between action A and action B. Please write your choice in the appropriate 
field.  
I choose action: _______. 
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You are participant B 
You can choose between the actions C and D. At first participant A decides between action A 
and action B. If participant A chooses action A, you receive 200 and participant A receives 
100 points. If participant A chooses action B, your choice determines the payoffs. If partici-
pant A chooses action B and you choose action C, you receive 150 points and participant A 
receives 150 points. If participant A chooses action B and you choose action D, you receive 
150 points and participant A receives 100 points. Your choice is only of relevance if partici-
pant A chooses action B. Thus, make your decision on the assumption that participant A has 
chosen action B. The sequence of the experiment is show in following figure: 
 
You can choose between action C and action D. Please write your choice in the appropriate 
field.  
I choose action: _______. 
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Appendix A.3 
A.3.1  Proof of Proposition 
In order to keep the analysis simple we assume that preferences and productivities are 
common knowledge, that agents compare their payoff within the work group but not with the 
agents outside the work group and not with the principal, and, finally, that the principal only 
cares for monetary payoff. 
Proposition 1: Given that all group members are sufficiently inequality averse, the 
 dominant strategy for all j = 1,2,3,4 within a group is to provide 10=∗je   
 if GTjj s
q
8
1−≥β . The principal can induce these choices by 
j
jGT
q
s
)( β−
≥
18
. 
 Proof:  
 Assume that 4=j  and 3,2,1=i  so that 4,3,2,1=k  with kj∈ , ki∈  and ji ≠ . 
Since the utility function is linear the agents maximize their utility at a corner solu-
tion. Thus agents either contribute no effort or eliminate inequalities by contributing 
equally positive efforts. Given the latter case and maximal contributions – i.e., 
10=ke  – there is no inequality so that j’s utility jU  is: 
 GTj
k
kk
GT
j feqesU +−


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
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2
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.  
 Next we determine the deviation utility – i.e., agent j’s utility if he/she contributes 
0=je  while the other agents contribute 10=ie  so that j’s utility jU  is: 
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 A sufficiently inequality averse agent j will contribute 10* =je  if his/her utility is higher 
than for free-riding. This holds if: 
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This inequality can be simplified to: 
 





− ∑=
3
1
2
1
1
i
ij en
β ≥ 





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
−
4
2 jj
GT
j
qes
e . 
Since in equilibrium all agents contribute the same effort we can simplify this expression to: 
 jj eβ2 ≥ 







−
4
2 jj
GT
j
qes
e   ⇔   jβ ≥
GT
j sq8
1
1− .  
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A.3.2  Variable List and Regression Tables of Chapter 3 
 
Table A.3.1: Variable List of Chapter 3 
 
Variable Scale Description 
 
Effort in GT 
 
0, 1,2, …, 10 
 
amount contributed to the group task 
Effort in IT 0, 1,2, …, 10 amount contributed to the individual task 
Share GT 0%, 10%,…, 
100% 
return share kept by agent in group task 
Fix GT -15, -14, …, 15 fixed wage in group task 
Share IT 0%, 10%,…, 
100% 
return share kept by agent in individual task 
Fix IT -15, -14, …, 15 fixed wage in individual task 
HT 0-1 coded subject has productivity 7.5 in group task 
LT 0-1 coded subject has productivity 2.5 in group task 
Period 1, 2, …, 10 period of the game 
Low Team Produc-
tivity 0-1 coded all players in team have productivity 2.5 
Asym. Team 0-1 coded players have different productivities 
Sym. Team 0-1 coded players have all equal productivities 
Average Team 
Productivity 
2.5, 3.75, 5.00, 
6.25, 7.50 mean of team members productivity 
Alpha 0-1 coded high unfavored inequality aversion 
Alpha missing 0-1 coded unfavored inequality aversion is missing  
value 
Beta 0-1 coded high favored inequality aversion 
Beta missing 0-1 coded favored inequality aversion is missing value 
Risk aversion 0-1 coded 
Risk aversion according to Holt and Laury 
(2002) Risk loving 0-1 coded Risk missing 0-1 coded 
Male 0-1 coded person is male 
WV survey trust 0-1 coded person trusts the most people 
Self control (1,2, …,10) 
16 PA personality factors according to 
Brandstätter (1988) 
Emotional Stability (1,2, …,10) 
Independence (1,2, …,10) 
Tough-mindness (1,2, …,10) 
Extraversion (1,2, …,10) 
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Table A.3.2: Regression Results of Regression on Effort in GT 
 
Variable  Coeffi-
cient 
Robust Std. 
Error 
P-Value 
Asymmetric Team * Fix-GT 0.323 0.141 0.023 
Asymmetric Team * Share GT 0.050 0.008 0.000 
Asymmetric Team *Average Team Productivity 
0.071 0.028 0.012 
Asymmetric Team -7.779 1.167 0.000 
Low Team Productivity -3.555 1.210 0.012 
Period -0.262 0.057 0.000 
Constant 8.530 0.659 0.000 
Model Statistics: N = 800 
P-Value: 0.000 
Pseudo R2: 0.032 
   
Dependent  
Variable:  Effort in GT 
   
Method:  Tobit Regression    
Notes: Base category is symmetric team with productivity 7.5.  
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Table A.3.3: Regression Results of Regression on Tasks Selection 
 
Choice of Tasks, multinomial logistic regression 
GT versus IT 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error P-Value 
Share in GT 0.030 0.005 0.000 
Fix in GT 0.112 0.019 0.000 
Share in IT -0.025 0.006 0.000 
Fix in IT -0.148 0.022 0.000 
Share in GT * HT 0.014 0.008 0.073 
Fix in GT * HT 0.051 0.032 0.119 
Share in IT * HT -0.018 0.009 0.046 
Fix in IT * HT -0.070 0.039 0.077 
HT 0.804 0.785 0.306 
Alpha-high 0.504 0.193 0.009 
Alpha-missing 0.269 0.233 0.247 
Beta-high 0.287 0.176 0.102 
Beta-missing -0.364 0.284 0.200 
Period 0.237 0.097 0.014 
Period2 -0.016 0.008 0.052 
Constant -0.630 0.647 0.330 
Exit Option versus IT 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P-Value 
Share in GT 0.005 0.008 0.547 
Fix in GT -0.085 0.027 0.002 
Share in IT -0.024 0.011 0.028 
Fix in IT -0.245 0.040 0.000 
Share in GT * HT -0.014 0.011 0.175 
Fix in GT * HT -0.022 0.040 0.587 
Share in IT * HT 0.004 0.016 0.790 
Fix in IT * HT -0.042 0.061 0.494 
HT 0.662 1.137 0.561 
Alpha-high 0.856 0.400 0.032 
Alpha-missing -0.132 0.590 0.824 
Beta-high 0.386 0.350 0.270 
Beta-missing -1.376 0.599 0.022 
Period 0.380 0.231 0.100 
Period2 -0.018 0.017 0.284 
Constant -3.119 1.099 0.005 
Model Statistics: N = 1440 
P-Value: 0.000 
Pseudo R2: 0.2523 
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A.3.3  Instructions 
 
Instructions for the Experiment of Chapter 3 (translated from German) 
 
You are participating in two decision experiments. At the end you will be paid according to 
your performance. Therefore it is important, that you understand the following instructions. 
 
Instructions for Experiment 1 
 
- Roll Assignment 
 
17 participants are taking part in the decision experiment 1. Each participant has one of three 
roles. One participant is of the type A (player A), eight participants are of the type B (player 
B) and eight participants are of the type C (player C). Your type is randomly determined at 
the beginning of the experiment and is displayed to you on your screen. Your type remains 
constant throughout the experiment and is shown on the top of the screen to remind you of 
your role assignment. 
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- Payoff 
 
The experiment consists of several periods. During the experiment payoffs are measured in 
points and displayed on your account. At the beginning each participant’s account has an 
amount of 50 points. Profits are added to your account and losses are subtracted from your 
account. In the case of a negative account balance you continue to participate in the experi-
ment. Due to profits you can again obtain a positive account balance. At the end your payoffs 
are converted into Euro and paid to you in cash. If your account balance is negative at the end, 
you receive a payoff of 0 euro for experiment 1. The following rules apply to the conversion 
of points into euros:  
• For player B and C:  10 points = 1 euro 
• For player A:   100 points = 1 euro 
 
- Other Details 
 
Please note that during the experiment communication is not allowed. If you have any ques-
tions, please raise your hand out of the cubicle. All decisions are made anonymously. No oth-
er participant will experience your name and your monetary payoff. 
 
Best of luck! 
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Experiment 1 consists of 10 periods and 17 players: one player of type A, eight players of 
type B and eight players of type C. 
 
Procedures for each period: 
 
1. Player A proposes a payment scheme for an individual project (Project I) and a pay-
ment scheme for a group project (Project II) which are announced to all players B and 
C. Payment scheme I determines the payoff for project I and consists of a return share I 
(percentage of the individual return) and a fixed wage I. Payment scheme II determines 
the payoff for project II and consists of a return share II (percentage of the group return) 
and a fixed wage II. 
 
2. Each player B or C decides whether he or she accepts payment scheme I, payment 
scheme II or neither of them. 
 
3.a. Participation in Project I 
Given a player B or C accepts the payment scheme I, he or she participates in project I 
(individual project) and chooses an investment level (0, 1, …, 10) with the correspond-
ing investment costs (investment cost = 2* investment level). The chosen investment 
level determines the individual return (individual return = 3* investment level). 
Thus the following payoffs results: 
period payoff player B (C) = individual return * return share I 
 + fixed wage I 
 − investment costs 
 
period payoff player A = individual return * (100% − return 
share I) − fixed wage I 
This means: Player B (C) receives the agreed return share I of the individual return plus 
the fixed wage I minus the own investment costs. Player A receives the remaining return 
share of the individual return minus the fixed wage I.  
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Displayed information to the players: Player B (C) is informed about individual return 
and own payoff for the particular period. Player A is informed about the number of 
players in individual projects. Additionally, he or she is informed about the sum of all 
individual returns and the sum of the payoffs from individual projects. 
 
3.b. Participation in Project II 
Given that several players B or C accepted the payment scheme II, groups of 4 members 
are formed out of the players who want to participate in project II (group project). 
Group members can be of different types. The group composition is random. Redundant 
participants can’t participate in a group project. They are informed and can decide, 
whether to alternatively accept payment scheme I or not. If so, see point 3.a. If not, see 
point 3.c. 
 
Each of the four members of a group choose an investment level (0, 1, …, 10) with the 
corresponding investment costs (investment cost = 2 x investment level) without the 
knowledge of the other group members decisions. You will be informed about types of 
your group members (type B or type C ) before choosing investment level. The chosen 
individual investment level determines the individual return contribution for each group 
member.  
 
Individual return contribution of participant is B = 2.5 * investment level 
Individual return contribution of participant is C = 7.5 * investment level 
The sum of the four individual return contributions is the group return. 
Thus the following payoff results: 
period payoff player B (C) = group return * (return share II)/4 
 + fixed wage II 
 − investment costs 
 
period payoff player A = group return * (100% − return share 
II) − 4 * fixed wage II 
This means: Each group member receives one fourth of the agreed share of the group re-
turn (return share II) plus the fixed wage II minus the own investment costs. Participant 
A receives the remaining share of the group return minus the four fixed wages. 
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Displayed information to the players: Player B (C) is informed about the group return 
and own period payoff. Participant A is informed about the number of participants in 
group projects, the sum of all group returns and the sum of payoffs from group projects. 
 
3.c. No participation in any project 
Given a player B (C) has neither accepted payment scheme I nor payment scheme II, he 
or she participates in no investment project in this period and receives the payoff 0. 
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Rules for the payment scheme: 
o The return share can equal 0%, 10%, …, or 100%.  
Return shares I and II can be different. 
o The fixed wage can equal -15, -14, …, 0, 1, … or 15.  
Fixed wages I and II can also be different.  
Within the given limitations return share and fixed wages can be arbitrary chosen. A positive 
fixed wage means a payment of player A to the respective player B (C). A negative fixed 
wage means a payment of a player B (C) to player A. 
 
End of a period and further periods 
After the investment decisions payoffs are calculated. The period ends. Your period payoff 
and your account balance are displayed to you. The next period starts according to the same 
rules. 
  
  116 
 
Instructions for the additional Experiments (translated from German) 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Figure A.3.1: Z-tree screenshot of Elicitation of unfavored inequality aversion 
 
 
Notes: Players have to decide upon one of each column in every row. The procedure is as 
proposed by Danneberg et al. 2007. 
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Experiment 3 
 
Figure A.3.2: Z-tree screenshot of Elicitation of favored inequality aversion 
 
 
Notes: Players have to decide upon one of each column in every row. The procedure is as 
proposed by Danneberg et al. 2007. 
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Experiment 4 
 
Figure A.3.3: Z-tree screenshot of Elicitation of Risk Preferences 
 
 
Notes: Players have to decide upon one of two lotteries in every row. The procedure is as pro-
posed by Holt and Laury (2002). 
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Appendix A.4 
A.4.1  Predictions of Behavior 
A.4.1.1 Prediction with Inequality Aversion 
Suppose that players are inequality averse and their utility function is well described by 
the utility function introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) which is already detailed de-
scribed in A.2.1.1.1. If the dictator is subject A and his/her opponent is subject B, the dicta-
tor’s utility function is as follows: 
{ } { }00 ,max,max BAAABAAAU ππβππαπ −−−−=  
Since 2112 AABB ππππ ==>  the dictator’s utility can be reduced to 
)( ABAAAU ππαπ −−= . I denote the utility of the dictator for choosing column 1 by )( 1CU A  
and for choosing column 2 by )( 2CU A . The dictator (weakly) prefers column 1 if 
)()( 21 CUCU AA ≥ . This condition is fulfilled if: )()( 222111 ABAAABAA ππαπππαπ −−≥−−  
which is equivalent to )( 2221 ABAAA ππαππ −−≥  and to 0≥Aα . It is easy to see that only a 
selfish dictator – i.e., if 0=Aα  – is indifferent between column 1 and column 2. He/she 
strictly prefers column 1 if 0>Aα . 
A.4.1.2 Prediction with Quasi-Maximin Preferences 
Suppose that the utility function of the players is well described by quasi-maximin pref-
erences introduced by Charness and Rabin (2002) which is already detailed described in 
A.2.1.2.1. If the dictator is subject A and his/her opponent is subject B, the dictator’s utility 
function is as follows: 



≥+
≤−+
==
BAB
BABA
BAAU ππλδππλδ
πππδλπ
ππ
    if    )-(1
    if        )(
),(
A
1
 
Since 2112 AABB ππππ ==>  the dictator’s utility can be reduced to 
BABAAU πδλπππ )(),( −+== 1 . I denote the utility of the dictator for choosing column 1 by 
)( 1CU A  and for choosing column 2 by )( 2CU A . The dictator (weakly) prefers column 2 if 
)()( 21 CUCU AA ≤ . This condition is fulfilled if: 2211 11 BABA πδλππδλπ )()( −+≤−+  which 
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is equivalent to 21 BB λπλπ ≤ . It is easy to see that only a selfish dictator – i.e., if 0=λ  – is 
indifferent between column 1 and column 2. He/she strictly prefers column 2 if ( ]10,∈λ .  
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A.4.2  Instructions 
 
Instructions for the Experiment of Chapter 3 (translated from German) 
 
Depending on your decisions you can earn money within the experiments. Earnings will be 
added to your account while loses will be subtracted. In the end of the experiment your earn-
ings will be paid cash. Earnings are denoted by points.  
 
Please note that during the experiment communication is not allowed. If you have any ques-
tion, please raise your hand out of the cubicle. All decisions are made anonymously. No other 
participant will experience your name and your monetary payoff. 
 
Schedule of the experiment: 
 
You will be randomly divided into groups with two members. Each group consists of a partic-
ipant A and a participant B. You will learn your type later. Participants‘ types will not change 
during the experiment. 
 
Decision for Participant A: 
Participant A decides on the division of points between himself/herself and       
participant B. 
 
Decision for Participant B: 
Participant B has no influence on the division of points. 
 
The “Table” shows 11 rows with two payoff pairs (column 1 and column 2). Participant A 
chooses in each row one payoff pair (either column 1 or column 2). 
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Please make your choice in the experiment in the role of participant A. If you are actually in 
the role of participant A or in the role of participant B, will be told you after all decisions are 
made.  
Please complete this “Table” on your screen by ticking column 1 or column 2 in each of the 
11 rows. You may switch between column 1 and column 2 once.  
 
Table 
 
After completing the “Table” one of the 11 rows will be randomly chosen that determinates 
participants points. You will be paid according to the chosen column by participant A of the 
relevant row. 
Furthermore, you will receive 8 points for participating on the experiment.  
Points are converted into euros according to the following rule: 
 
1 point = 0.5 euro 
Best of luck! 
 
# Column 1 Column 2 
1 Participant A: 10;  Participant B: 10 Participant A: 10; Participant B: 10 
2 Participant A: 9;   Participant B: 9 Participant A: 9;   Participant B: 10 
3 Participant A: 8;   Participant B: 8 Participant A: 8;   Participant B: 10 
4 Participant A: 7;   Participant B: 7 Participant A: 7;   Participant B: 10 
5 Participant A: 6;   Participant B: 6 Participant A: 6;   Participant B: 10 
6 Participant A: 5;   Participant B: 5 Participant A: 5;   Participant B: 10 
7 Participant A: 4;   Participant B: 4 Participant A: 4;   Participant B: 10 
8 Participant A: 3;   Participant B: 3 Participant A: 3;   Participant B: 10 
9 Participant A: 2;   Participant B: 2 Participant A: 2;   Participant B: 10 
10 Participant A: 1;   Participant B: 1 Participant A: 1;   Participant B: 10 
11 Participant A: 0;   Participant B: 0 Participant A: 0;   Participant B: 10 
